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Rethinking American Arbitration
THOMAS J. STioPANOwicH*
INTRODUCTION
American arbitration' has come of age. In the seven decades since the
dawn of the "modern era" of arbitration, its proponents have secured
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Construction Industry for their constructive comments and criticisms. Special thanks are due
to David McCreary of the University of Kentucky Computing Center for his invaluable assistance
in structuring a computer analysis of voluminous data, and to Terry McKinley and Nancy
Bowman, University of Kentucky law students, for their research assistance.
1. "Arbitration" is a process whereby parties voluntarily submit their disputes for reso-
lution by one or more impartial third persons, instead of by a judicial tribunal provided by
law. See M. DomCE ON COMMERClAL ARBITRATION § 1:01, at 1 (G. Wilner ed. 1984) [hereinafter
DomXE]. The late Soia Mentschikoff, a serious student of arbitration, identified four essential
characteristics of the process: an agreement by the parties to arbitrate; a dispute resolution
process outside the courts; a decision by the third party arbitrator (as opposed to a settlement
or compromise); and, the recognition of that decision as final and binding in accordance with
the prior agreement of the parties. Mentschikoff, The Significance of Arbitration-A Prelim-
inary Inquiry, 17 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 698, 699 (1952). While arbitration is adversarial
rather than conciliatory in nature, it is very different from traditional litigation. Faure, The
Arbitration Alternative: Its Time Has Come, 46 MONT. L. Rav. 199, 200 (1985). See also infra
notes 36-176 and accompanying text.
This Article addresses commercial arbitration, a broad rubric encompassing resolution of
disputes under many different forms of contract. It differs from labor arbitration in both
character and purpose. See S. LAzARus, J. BRAY, L. CARTER, K. COLLINS, B. GIEDT, R.
HOLTON, P. MATTHEws & G. WILLARD, RESOLVINo BusNEss DispuTms: THE POTENTIAL OF
COmaERcIAL ARBITRATION 15-17 (1965) [hereinafter S. LAZARus]. See also Stipanowich, Punitive
Damages in Arbitration: Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc. Reconsidered, 66 B.U.L. REv. 953, 953
n.1 (1986).
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institutional acceptance of the process from business, bench and bar.2 A
series of recent decisions by the United States Supreme Court have signifi-
cantly limited permissible judicial and legislative restrictions on the right to
arbitrate under federal law.3 These decisions offer dramatic evidence of
2. The modern era of American arbitration began in the 1920's with the passage of a New
York state statute making agreements to arbitrate future contract disputes enforceable. See S.
LAzARus, supra note I, at 19; Jones, Historical Development of Commercial Arbitration in
the United States, 12 MNN. L. REv. 240, 249 (1928); Jones, Three Centuries of Commercial
Arbitration in New York: A Brief Survey, 1956 WASH. U.L.Q. 193, 194. Extensive lobbying
efforts secured the passage of federal legislation modeled on the New York act. See Faure,
supra note 1, at 202 (Congress enacted the United States Arbitration Act, now codified at 9
U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982), to deliberately alter judicial hostility towards arbitration). Eventually,
similar measures were enacted by the great majority of states. See Note, Arbitrability of Disputes
Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 71 IowA L. RFv. 1137, 1139-41 (1986) (identifying 45 state
statutes enforcing arbitration of future disputes, many of which follow the Uniform Arbitration
Act, 7 U.L.A. 5 (1985); Comment, Arbitration: Making Court-Annexed Arbitration an At-
tractive Alternative in Texas, 16 ST. MARY'S L.J. 409, 414 n.ll, 420-21 & n.44 (1985).
Favorable legislation encouraged the use of arbitration by business and industry groups.
See Kronstein, Arbitration Is Power, 38 N.Y.U. L. REv. 661, 663 (1963) (observing that
"institutional" arbitration is a distinguishing feature of the modern era). At first, institutional
use of arbitration was generally limited to disputes among businesspersons. See generally
Mentschikoff, Commercial Arbitration, 61 CoLtrm. L. REv. 846, 848-56 (1961) (discussing
mercantile arbitration and its historical roots). Today, however, the widespread employment
of arbitration agreements in commercial boilerplate affects not only merchants and busines-
spersons, but customers and clients as well. Id. at 864. See, e.g., Glaberson, Brokers See Gains;
Lawyers Uneasy, N.Y. Times, June 9, 1987, at D5, col. 1 (addressing the affect of arbitration
provisions in brokerage contracts on investors).
In recent years, judicial decisions have provided a significant stimulus to arbitration. The
courts, having overcome the notion that agreements to arbitrate are inimical to public policy,
tend to liberally enforce agreements to arbitrate in furtherance of perceived public policies of
the first magnitude. See Stipanowich, supra note 1, at 970-78; cf. Note, The Consequences of
a Broad Arbitration Clause Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 52 B.U.L. REv. 571 (1972)
(courts liberal enforcement of arbitration agreements is a reaction to their initial reluctance).
But cf. Allison, Arbitration Agreements and Antitrust Claims: The Need for Enhanced Ac-
commodation of Conflicting Public Policies, 64 N.C.L. REv. 219 (1986) (courts conclude that
arbitration clauses are not binding when they concern private antitrust claims).
3. In Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983), the
Court recognized the Federal Arbitration Act as a source of "federal substantive law of
arbitrability" preempting contrary state "substantive or procedural policies." Id. at 24. In
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984), the Court gave dramatic effect to the preemption
principle by ordering arbitration of a cause of action under a state statute which required
judicial resolution of such claims. The next year, the Court extended this rationale to require
arbitration of state securities claims which were pendent to non-arbitrable federal securities
claims. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985). For a discussion of this
trilogy, see Hirschman, The Second Arbitration Trilogy: The Federalization of Arbitration Law,
71 VA. L. REv. 1305 (1985). See also Stipanowich, Arbitration, 74 Ky. L.J. 319, 335-43 (1986);
Note, Arbitrability of Disputes Under the Federal Arbitration Act, supra note 2, at 1141-43;
Note, Federal and State Securities Claims: Litigation or Arbitration-Dean Witter Reynolds,
Inc. v. Byrd, 105 S. Ct. 1238 (1985), 61 WASH. L. Rav. 245 (1986) [hereinafter Note, Litigation
or Arbitration].
More recently, the Court enforced arbitration of other issues which were widely believed
to be nonarbitrable. In Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614 (1985), the Court ordered enforcement of an agreement to resolve statutory antitrust claims,
including treble damages, by arbitration in an international transaction. The Court brushed
[Vol. 63:425
AMERICAN ARBITRATION
contemporary faith in arbitration as a successful, wide-ranging substitute
for civil litigation.
The success of arbitration is a reflection of the shortcomings of the
American civil justice system.4 Modern judicial process is characterized by
aside public policy arguments against arbitral consideration of antitrust issues and reaffirmed
a strong belief in the effectiveness of arbitration as a means of dealing with international
commercial disputes. See Note, Mitsubishi and Antitrust Arbitration-It's All the Japanese
You Need to Know, 1986 B.Y.U. L. REv. 219, 226-29.
In 1987, the Court further advanced the cause of arbitration by extending its reach to
include investor fraud claims under section 10(b) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act and SEC
Rule lOb-5. Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 2332 (1987). Prior to
the decision, a number of lower courts had refused to require arbitration of such claims, relying
on the similarity between provisions of the Exchange Act and the Securities Act of 1933, both
of which declare void any stipulation "to waive compliance with any provision" of the statute.
See, e.g., Greater Continental Corp. v. Schechter, 422 F.2d 1100, 1103 (2d Cir. 1970) (dicta).
But see Hoellering, Arbitrability in the Wake of Byrd and Mitsubishi, 195 N.Y.L.J., Apr. 10,
1986, at 1, col. I (observing recent trend toward enforcement of arbitration of Exchange Act
claims). The Supreme Court had declared such "non-waiver" language to prohibit enforcement
of arbitration of claims under section 12(2) of the Securities Act in Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S.
427 (1953). In McMahon, however, Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, insisted that
Wilko only barred arbitration where that process was "inadequate to protect the substantive
rights at issue." 107 S. Ct. at 2334. Justice O'Connor observed that Wilko was "difficult to
reconcile ... with [the] Court's subsequent decisions involving the [Arbitration Act]," and
that underlying concerns regarding the ability of arbitrators to handle the complex statutory
claims had since been rejected by the Court. Id. at 2335. Moreover, Justice O'Connor noted,
there had been substantial "intervening changes in the regulatory structure of the securities
laws" since Wilko, with the SEC assuming a much broader role in overseeing securities regulatory
organizations and their arbitration rules. Id. Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan and
Marshall, dissented on the basis that the Rule 10(b) claims, like claims under the Securities
Act, fell squarely within the Wilko exception to the otherwise broad coverage of the Federal
Arbitration Act. Id. at 2346-49. The dissenters also evidenced a concern with practicalities such
as limitations on judicial revicw of arbitral awards and limited oversight by the SEC. Id. at
2353-58. Justice Stevens dissented on the basis that in light of the judiciary's longstanding
application of Wilko to the Exchange Act, the issue should be addressed by Congress. Id. at
2359-60.
In the same case, the Court unanimously approved arbitration of civil claims under the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1964) (commonly
referred to as RICO). Writing for the Court, Justice O'Connor could find nothing in the text
of the statute or its legislative history indicating that Congress intended to remove RICO treble
damage claims from arbitration. 107 S. Ct. at 2344-45. Justice O'Connor also rejected the
notion that the potential complexity of such claims, or their "incidental policing function,"
should affect their arbitrability. Id.
4. See generally Goldstein, Alternatives for Resolving Business Transaction Disputes, 58
ST. JoAN's L. REv. 69 (1983), Lurie, The Choice: Litigation or Arbitration?, PROF. SERV. Q.
(2nd Qtr. 1982) at 8; Max, Arbitration-The Alternative to Timely, Costly Litigation, 42 ALA.
LAW. 309 (1981); Phillips, Rules of Law or Laissez-Faire in Commercial Arbitration, 47 HARv.
L. REv. 590, 599 (1934); Sergi, Arbitration: A Lawyer's Tool for the Future, 13 BARISTER
43 (1986); Taeusch, Extrajudicial Settlement of Controversies-The Business Man's Opinion:
Trial at Law v. Nonjudicial Settlement, 83 U. PA. L. Rav. 147, 148-51 (1934); Note, Predict-
ability of Result in Commercial Arbitration, 61 HAnv. L. REv. 1022 (1948); Arbitration Agony:
Tortuous Case Poses Problems Industry Would Like to Solve, ENO. Navs REc., Feb. 24, 1983,
at 59, 60, col. 3 [hereinafter Arbitration Agony].
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high cost, excessive formality, and long delays.- Having gone to the time
and trouble of bringing a case through interminable pretrial motion practice,
attempting to educate the decisionmaker while observing the intricacies of
trial procedure, and waiting out a lengthy appeal, even a "victorious" litigant
may well question whether justice has been served. 6
In the past decade, dissatisfaction with traditional adjudication of disputes
has given rise to more general experimentation with forms of "ADR" (al-
ternative dispute resolution).7 Reform-minded jurists, practitioners, and ed-
5. Delays and inefficiencies in the justice system have been attributed to the inability of
the court system to handle greater and greater numbers of cases, extensive pretrial and posttrial
procedures, inefficient judicial management, and procrastination by attorneys and judges. See
generally Cooke, The Highways and Byways of Dispute Resolution, 55 ST. JoHN's L. REv.
611 (1981); de Seife, A Plea for the Creation of Commercial Courts, 17 NEw ENG. L. REv.
437, 438-44 (1982); Lasker, The Court Crunch: A View from the Bench, 70 F.R.D. 245 (1977);
Williams, Court Delays and the High Cost of Civil Litigation: Causes, Alternatives, Solutions,
71 ILL. B.J. 84 (1982). Recent efforts to reform federal discovery rules are a result of growing
criticism of the tendency of the process to permit abuse, produce delays and excessive costs.
See generally Janofsky, The "Big Case"--A "Big Burden" on Our Courts, '1980 UTAH L.
REv. 719, 720, 723-24; Marcus, Reducing Court Costs and Delay: The Potential Impact of the
Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 66 JUnicATUlt 363 (1983).
6. As one commentator observed, due process is not realized when a claimant must. absorb
attorney's fees and other costs equalling 30% to 50% of the amount at issue while losing the
use value of the claimed principal. Max, supra note 4, at 309. See also Lasker, supra
note 5, at 250. In addition to straining the pocketbook, lengthy litigation can induce severe
emotional strain in parties and their attorneys. See Goldstein, supra note 4, at 75 n.15 (describing
"litigation neuroses" induced by lengthy proceedings). Delays also increase the likelihood that
witness testimony will be unavailable or less reliable at the time of trial. Nagel, Predicting and
Reducing Court-Case Time Through Simple Logic, 60 N.C.L. REv. 103, 105 (1981).
Some critics of the judicial system also question whether that time-honored body, the jury,
is fit to address complex commercial and legal issues. See, e.g., de Seife, supra note 5, at 438.
See also Delgado, Dunn, Brown, Lee & Hubbert, Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk
of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 1359, 1365 [hereinafter
Delgado] (noting Chief Justice Burger's suggestion that complex cases be heard by judges rather
than juries); Devlin, Jury Trial of Complex Cases: English Practice at the Time of the Seventh
Amendment, 80 CoLum. L. REv. 43 (1980) (concluding that at the time of the adoption of the
seventh amendment, the practical abilities and limitations of juries were important considerations
in determining whether to permit a case to be decided by a jury). In one case, the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the seventh amendment does not guarantee the right
to jury trial when the lawsuit is found to be too complex for the jury. In re Japanese Elec.
Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980). But see In re United States Fin. Sec.
Antitrust Litig., 609 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied sub nom. Gant v. Union Bank, 446
U.S. 929 (1980) (holding that the seventh amendment applies without regard to the size or
complexity of a suit).
More and more of late, commentators have challenged the notion that traditional processes
are the only avenue to justice. See Bell, Crisis in the Courts: Proposals for Change, 31 VAmN.
L. REv. 3, 7 (1978); de Seife, supra note 5, at 443; Lasker, supra note 5, at 251, 256; Lurie,
supra note 4, at 9. Former Chief Justice Burger put the case most strongly when he described
our civil justice system as "too costly, too painful, too destructive, too inefficient for a truly
civilized people." Burger, Remarks at the Midyear Meeting of the ABA, 52 U.S.L.W. 2471
(Feb. 28, 1984).
7. See Delgado, supra note 6, at 1360; Edelman, Institutionalizing Dispute Resolution
Alternatives, 9 JUST. SYs. J. 134, 135-36 (1984); Henry, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Meeting
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ucators have encouraged disputants to lend objectivity to their negotiations
by means of third-party mediation" or mini-trial. 9 Other reformers trumpet
the glories of formalized pretrial procedures such as court-annexed arbitration 'o
and summary jury trial." In the current wave of enthusiasm for procedural
substitutes, consensual arbitration remains a favorite alternative.' 2
Arbitration is often described as everything that civil litigation is not.' 3
Observers frequently depict arbitration as a speedy and economical process' 4
the Legal Needs of the 1980s, I Omo ST. J. DisPuTE RESOLUTION 113 (1985); Nelson, Alternative
Dispute Resolution: A Supermartfor Law Reform, 14 N.M.L. REv. 467, 473-78 (1984); Sander,
Varieties of Dispute Processing, 70 F.R.D. 111 (1976) (recommending a "multi-door court-
house" offering various dispute resolution mechanisms tailored to various types of disputes);
Williams, supra note 5, at 86.
8. See generally Hart, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Negotiation, Mediation, and Min-
itrial, 37 FED'N INS. & Cospu. CouNs. Q. 113, 118-21 (1987); Friedman, When Is Mediation
an Alternative to Litigation?, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 4, 1985, at 20, col. 1; Mediation Picking Up
Steam, ENG. NEws REc., May 30, 1985, at 23, col. 1.
9. See generally E. GREEN, THE CPR LEGAL PROGRAM Mnm-TWA. HANDBOOK (1982);
Gorske, Alternative Dispute Resolution: The Mini-Trial, Wis. B. BULL., Feb. 1985, at 21; Hart,
supra note 8, at 122-24; Franklin, The Mini-Trial: What It Is and What It Isn't: What It Can
Do and What It Can't Do, Fidelity and Surety Law Committee, ABA Torts and Ins. Practice
Section (1982). See also Henry, supra note 7, at 115 (noting that mini-trials and other non-
adjudicative approaches may be effective in preserving relationships between the parties).
10. See Bell, supra note 6, at 7 & n.ll; Note, Compulsory Judicial Arbitration in California:
Reducing the Delay and Expense of Resolving Uncomplicated Civil Disputes, 29 HASTiNGs L.J.
475, 479-500 (1978) (discussing various judicial arbitration programs and their success at reducing
court dockets); Comment, supra note 2, at 428-32; Lempert, Arbitration Found Effective in
Expediting Settlement, Legal Times, May 25, 1981, at 2, col. 1 (describing the positive effect
of court-annexed arbitration in stimulating settlement in federal district court cases).
11. See Lambros, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Alternative Methods of Dispute
Resolution: A Report to the Judicial Conference of the United States Committee on the
Operation of the Jury System, 103 F.R.D. 465, 468-72 (1984); Lambros, Summary Jury Trial,
37 FED'N INS. & CoRP. CoUrs. Q. 139 (1987); Lambros & Shunk, The Summary Jury Trial,
29 Cruv. ST. L. REv. 43 (1980); Posner, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Methods of
Alternative Dispute Resolution: Some Cautionary Observations, 53 U. Cm. L. REv. 366 (1986);
Ranil, Summary Jury Trials Gain Favor, NAT'L L.J., June 10, 1985, at 1, col. 4.
12. See AAA Caseload Reaches Record High, APRB. TrmEs, Winter 1987, at 8, col. 1
(describing national trend in favor of arbitration of commercial cases). In 1976, 1,689 con-
struction cases were filed with the American Arbitration Association. By 1986, annual filings
had grown to 4,317 cases. American Arbitration Association, Construction Case Filings (1976-
1986), Press Release (1986).
13. See Aksen, Resolving Construction Contract Disputes Through Arbitration, 23 ARB. J.
141, 158 (1968); Coulson, Tailoring Arbitration to Business Needs, 19 Bus. LAw. 1037, 1043-
50 (1964); Faure, supra note 1, at 206; Goldstein, supra note 4, at 78-80; Jones, Arbitration
From the Viewpoint of the Practicing Attorney: An Analysis of Arbitration Cases Decided by
the New York State Court of Appeals from January 1973 to September 1985, 14 FoRDHAM
U"n. L.J. 523, 525-26 (1986); Max, supra note 4, at 311; Meyerowitz, The Arbitration Alter-
native, 71 A.B.A. J., Feb. 1985, at 78, 79-80; Middleton, Burger: Arbitrate More and Litigate
Less, 68 A.B.A. J. 257 (1982) (news report at col. 2); Rosenthal, A Businessman Looks at
Arbitration, 2 ARn. J. 138 (1947) (New Series); Sergi, supra note 4. See also Meisel, Arbitration:
An Alternative to the Courts for the Utility Contractor, NAT'L UrIL. CoNM., Dec. 1981, at
6. But see Comisky & Comisky, Commercial Arbitration-Panacea or Nightmare?, 47 Tmsp.
L.Q. 457, 459 (1974); Horowitz, Guides for Resorting to Commercial Arbitration, 8 PaAc.
LAw., Jan. 1962, at 67, 68-75; Lurie, supra note 4, at 9.
14. See infra notes 74-92 and accompanying text.
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characterized by informal hearings before one or more judges selected on
the basis of knowledge and expertise in the commercial context of the
dispute. 5 There is no extensive pretrial practice,' 6 and very little possibility
of successful appeal.' 7 The scheduling and location of the hearings may be
arranged for the parties' convenience, 8 and the proceedings conducted in
privacy. 9
Despite the current popularity of arbitration, its future remains in doubt.
Even now, proponents as well as critics of arbitration observe that it fre-
quently fails to live up to its billing as a "speedy and economical" substitute
for litigation, 20 especially in large or complex disputes.2' If the contemporary
supermarket of procedural alternatives results in significant improvements
to the civil justice system, arbitration may become a less viable option.
The primary responsibility for meeting such challenges rests with the
institution which is and always has been at the forefront of the arbitration
movement, the American Arbitration Association (AAA).2 Since its inception
in the early days of the modern era of arbitration, the AAA has given form
and substance to domestic and international arbitration.Y It has overseen
15. See infra notes 36-73 and accompanying text.
16. See infra note 38 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 84-88 and accompanying text.
18. See infra note -40 and accompanying text.
1.9. See infra note 55 and accompanying text.
20. See Bayer & Abrahams, The Trouble with Arbitration, 11 LITIo. 30 (Winter 1985);
Hart, A Provision in a Construction Contract Requiring Arbitration of Disputes Is a Disad-
vantage Both to the General Contractor and His Surety and to the Subcontractor and His
Surety, 31 INS. COUNS. J. 453, 456-57 (1964); Horowitz, supra note 13, at 68-70; Lyons,
Arbitration: The Slower, More Expensive Alternative?, AM. LAW., Jan.-Feb. 1985, at 107;
Lurie, supra note 4, at 9; Phillips, A Lawyer's Approach to Commercial Arbitration, 44 YALE
L.J. 31, 38-39 (1934); Arbitration Agony, supra note 4, at 59. See also I.N. DUNCAN WALLACE,
CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES IN TORT AND CONTRACT 267-71, 395-97
(1986) (discussing arbitration under modern English legislation).
21. C. PETERSON & C. MCCARTHY, ARBITRATION STRATEGY AND TECHNIQUE § 5-1, at 107-
08 (1986) [hereinafter C. PETERSON]; Fabyanske & Halverson, Arbitration: Is It an Acceptable
Method of Resolving Construction Contract Disputes?, 16 FORUM 281, 289 (1980); Kritzer &
Anderson, The Arbitration Alternative: A Comparative Analysis of Case Processing Time,
Disposition Mode, and Cost in the American Arbitration Association and the Courts, 8 JUST.
Sys. J. 16 (1983); Lyons, supra note 20, at 108-10; Solove, Alternative Means to Resolve
Corporate Disputes: A Survey, 91 Com. L.J. 133, 137-38 (1986).
22. The AAA is a nonprofit public service organization that promotes voluntary resolution
of disputes through arbitration and mediation. While there are other business and trade groups
that sponsor arbitration, including the New York Stock Exchange and other securities regulatory
organizations, the AAA is the preeminent forum for resolution of commercial disputes by
arbitration in the United States. See Meyerowitz, supra note 13, at 79. See also Max, supra
note 4, at 325 (observing that AAA arbitration rules are referenced in no less than forty statutes
in twenty different jurisdictions). See generally Mentschikoff, supra note 2 (comparing various
forms of commercial arbitration).
23. The organization that became the AAA was founded in the early 1920's by an illustrious
group including Dean (later Chief Justice) Harlan Stone and then Chief Justice Charles Evans
Hughes. Its purpose was the development of arbitration as an adjunct to the courts. See
[Vol. 63:425
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the development of arbitration rules24 and established nationwide panels of
arbitrators.2 Through its network of regional offices, the AAA administers
a growing number of commercial arbitrations, as well as other forms of
dispute resolution. 26 The AAA is also committed to ongoing experimentation
Gotshal, The Art of Arbitration, 48 A.B.A. J. 553, 553-54 (1962). This goal was furthered by
the creation of an independent national institution for the administration of arbitration. For
a detailed history of the AAA, see F. KELLOR, AMmRiCAN ARBITRATION: ITS HISTORY, FUNCTIONS
AND AcHIEvEMENTS 11-60 (1948).
24. The promulgation of rules governing arbitration procedure remains one of the most
significant contributions of the AAA. See F. KEILLOR, supra note 23, at 23-24, 64-65; Braden,
Sound Rules and Administration in Arbitration, 83 U. PA. L. REv. 189 (1934). In addition to
its standard Commercial Rules, the AAA has worked with industry and trade groups to develop
specialized industry rules. For example, the AAA Commercial Rules were slightly modified
with the assistance of representatives of the construction industry to develop uniform arbitration
procedures for owners, architects and contractors. See AMERicAN ARBITRATION ASSOciATION,
CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY ARBITRATION RULrs (Jan. 1, 1986) [hereinafter CONSTRUCTION RULEs].
Compare AuRicAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, COMERCIA.L ARBITRATION RuLis (Mar. 1, 1986)
[hereinafter COimiRcIAL RULEs].
The AAA also developed standardized contract clauses providing for arbitration of disputes
in accordance with appropriate AAA procedural rules. See, e.g., COMMERCIAL RtLES, supra,
at 2; CONSTRUCTION RULES, supra, at 6. The AAA derives most of its commercial business
from submissions under contractual arbitration clauses. See Meisel, supra note 13, at 6. See
also S. LAzARus, supra note I, at 22-24; Smith, Commercial Arbitration at the American
Arbitration Association, 11 ARB. J. 3, 5 (1956).
Among the trade and professional associations using AAA administered rules or recom-
mending the use of AAA services for member disputes are:
The Homeowners Warranty Corporation, The Asphalt Roofing Manufacturing
Association (mediation), The National Roofing Contractors Association (media-
tion), the General Arbitration Council (consisting of various manufacturers and
distributors of textiles and textile products), The Licensing Executives Society,
Inc., The International Foundation of Employee Benefit Plans, The American
Society of Association Executives, The National Fisheries Institute, The Associ-
ation of American Railroads, U.S. Home Corporation, The American Movers
Conference, The Movers and Warehousemen's Association, The American Fats
and Oils Association, The American Seed Trade Association, The American Spice
Trade Association, The Horizontal Property Regime, The American Land Title
Association, The Better Business Bureau (for home remodeling disputes), The
International Association for Financial Planning, The American Stamp Dealers
Association, and The National Construction Industry Arbitration Committee (con-
sisting of leading professional and trade organizations in the construction industry).
Letter from Constance O'Sullivan, AAA Director of Marketing, to author (Sept. 1, 1987)
(answering the author's request for trade/professional associations which provide for AAA
administration of their dispute resolution procedures).
In the wake of recent Congressional concerns regarding arbitration of securities disputes,
the AAA recently published a modified version of its standard commercial rules for use in
securities arbitration. See AmEiCAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, SEcuaRTrs ARBITRATION RULES
(Sept. 1, 1987). Prior to publication, the rules were subject to review and comment by the
Securities Exchange Commission. It is anticipated that the rules will be adopted for use in
many standard brokerage agreements. Telephone interview with George Friedman, AAA Vice
President for Case Administration (July 27, 1987).
25. The New York City-based organization currently maintains a nationwide pool of tens
of thousands of arbitrators of various specialties. Meyerowitz, supra note 13, at 79. This pool
includes more than 32,000 construction arbitrators. Letter from AAA Vice President Mark
Sholander to author (Jan. 14, 1987). See also F. KELLOR, supra note 23, at 31, 35-36.
26. See supra note 12.
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and research to understand and improve arbitration, 27 a task which it is
uniquely equipped to undertake. The experience of the AAA through its
nationwide "laboratory" should provide revealing insights into the successes
and failures of contemporary arbitration.
Unfortunately, efforts to determine how effectively arbitration works and
what improvements might be made to the system have been hampered by
the relative lack of meaningful empirical data. 28 There are few pertinent
studies upon which to base firm conclusions regarding the degree to which
arbitration fulfills its declared goals. 29 Most writings on the subject tend to
focus on personal experience.3 0
Recently, however, the American Bar Association sponsored a major sur-
vey of opinions and attitudes toward arbitration under AAA rules. 3' For the
first time in a quarter of a century, a significant number of attorneys were
canvassed on a wide, range of topics relating to their experiences as advocates
and arbitrators. The resulting data offers a detailed picture of contemporary
commercial arbitration as perceived by those most familiar with the process. 32
Based upon an analysis of the responses of the survey participants, this
Article Asse'ses the current status of arbitration and proposes means to
guarantee its future success as a vehicle of alternative dispute resolution. 33
Section I of this Article discusses conflicting views of modern commercial
arbitration, contrasting the advantages ascribed to the process by its pro-
ponents with concerns voiced by its critics. Section II presents a detailed
analysis of the results of the recent ABA arbitration survey, thus providing
a perspective for evaluation of the claimed advantages and disadvantages of
arbitration. Finally, section III draws conclusions from the survey analysis
and suggests possible reforms to procedural rules governing arbitration to
insure the continued viability of the process.
I. CONFLICTING PERCEPTIONS OF AMERICAN ARBITRATION
Proponents of arbitration invariably ascribe a variety of virtues to the
process: flexibility, informality, speed, economy, expertise in the factfinder,
27. See F. KELLOR, supra note 23, at 25, 55.
28. See Kritzer & Anderson, supra note 21, at 21-23 (observing that there is little data upon
which to evaluate the claimed advantages of various dispute resolution mechanisms, and few
empirical studies on arbitration). See also Middleton, Arbitration "Not Magic" But Cures
Some Ills, 68 A.B.A. J. 785, 786 (1982) (quoting ADR expert Frank Sander as saying we know
too little about arbitration).
29. For a discussion of published studies on arbitration and of data recently collected by
the AAA, see infra text accompanying notes 251-98.
30. For a discussion of conflicting perceptions of arbitration based largely on the personal
experiences and views of commentators, see infra text accompanying notes 34-176.
31. See infra text accompanying notes 177-82.
32. See infra text accompanying notes 183-250. The survey data is then compared to results
of other studies. See infra text accompanying notes 251-98.
33. See infra text accompanying notes 299-341.
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and finality.14 On the other hand, a growing number of critics challenge
these perceptions. These critics question whether arbitration offers real ad-
vantages over litigation.35 To fully appreciate the value of the ABA arbitra-
tion survey, it is important to explore and understand these contrasting views
of the commercial arbitration process.
A. Perceived Advantages of Arbitration
1. Flexibility and Informality
As a creature of contract, arbitration is essentially what the parties make
it.36 Thus, depending upon the terms of the agreement to arbitrate, the
process may be informal or may incorporate certain features of formal
litigation. 7 Parties choosing an informal process may avoid lengthy pre-
hearing motion practice and discovery.38 The parties may opt for hearings
before one or more arbitrators of their choice, or forego hearings entirely
and submit evidence in written form. 39
Regardless of the process chosen by the parties, hearings may be sched-
uled without reference to crowded court dockets and may be held at any
location upon which the parties can agree. 40 Formal rules of evidence and
34. See infra text accompanying notes 36-92.
35. See infra text accompanying notes 93-176.
36. See Coulson, supra note 7, at 1037. See also Carlston, Theory of the Arbitration Process,
17 LAw & CoNTEmp. PRoBS. 631, 635-36 (1952) ("Arbitration is a chameleon word, assuming
varying significance as the social setting in which it takes place varies."); Faure, supra note 1,
at 210. The dichotomy of arbitration lies in the fact that although arbitrators derive their power
from private contract, they serve to impart justice as a surrogate for the courts. See generally
Isaacs, Two Views of Commercial Arbitration, 40 HAzv. L. Rnv. 929 (1927) (providing a
thorough analysis of both the "agency" and "judicial substitute" theories of arbitration).
37. See infra text accompanying notes 47-52.
38. Sergi, supra note 4, at 44. Much of the time, effort, and expense of civil litigation is
directly related to discovery. The use of discovery in arbitration might tend to undermine the
goals of speed and economy, particularly in small cases. C. PETERSON, supra note 21, at 107.
The availability of discovery in arbitration depends upon applicable statutes and rules. Id.
at 109-11. The Uniform Arbitration Act (LJAA), upqn which many state arbitration statutes
are based, authorizes arbitrators to "issue ... subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses and
for the production of books, records, documents and other evidence . . . ." The UAA also
allows arbitrators to "permit a deposition to be taken ... of a witness who cannot be
subpoenaed or is unable to attend the hearing." UNIm. ARB. ACT § 7, 7 U.L.A. 1, 114 (1985).
The Federal Arbitration Act contains no similar provision. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982).
For a discussion of discovery under the AAA Commercial Rules, see infra note 48.
39. The UAA contemplates hearings "unless otherwise provided by the [parties'] agree-
ment." UNm. ARB. ACT § 5, 7 U.L.A. 1, 99 (1985).
40. See Sergi, supra note 4, at 45. See also CoamicmL. RuLas, supra note 24, §§ 11, 21.
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trial procedure may be avoided; 41 attorneys need not be present. 42 Arbi-
trators may have considerable flexibility in the formulation of remedies
within the scope of the arbitration agreement. They may tailor relief to
fit the circumstances, unbound generally by legal or equitable principles
save their own sense of justice and fairness.4 1
Of course, for arbitration to be effective the parties must establish some
specific guidelines for the process." However, few contracting parties have
the time or the inclination to draft their own rules. 45 Thus, for reasons of
convenience, many types of commercial agreements incorporate the rules of
the American Arbitration Association. 46
The AAA Rules are exemplary arbitration provisions which attempt to
accommodate the desire for flexibility within a workable procedural frame-
work. They provide guidelines for submitting disputes to arbitration and for
selecting arbitrators, but they avoid setting rigid rules for prehearing motion
practice. 47 The AAA Rules do not prohibit prehearing discovery; however,
they do not make specific provision for arbitrator-ordered exchange of
documents or other discovery prior to the commencement of hearings. 4 The
41. One commentator observes that since rules of evidence evolved to deal with the problem
of communicating with a jury, they are inappropriate in arbitration. Carlston, supra note 36,
at 650. Carl Taeusch insisted that businesspersons want arbitrators to listen to evidence that
an attorney or judge might deem irrelevant, and leave to the arbitrators the task of deciding
what is important and what is not. Taeusch, supra note 4, at 159. The UAA merely requires
that both parties be given an opportunity "to be heard, to present evidence material to the
controversy and to cross-examine witnesses appearing at the hearing." UNIF. ARB. ACT § 5(b),
7 U.L.A. 1, 99 (1985).
42. The UAA gives arbitrating parties the right to be represented by counsel, and forbids
pre-hearing waiver of such right. UNnF. ARB. ACT § 6, 7 U.L.A. 1, 113 (1985). Traditionally,
however, a number of trade associations have forbidden the use of attorneys in arbitration of
disputes between members. See Mentschikoff, supra note 2, at 859. On the other hand, the
AAA encourages participation by members of the bar as advocates and arbitrators. Id.
43. See generally Stipanowich, supra note 1, at 978-82 (discussing the broad power of
arbitrators to fashion remedies).
44. See generally Braden, Sound Rules and Administration in Arbitration, 83 U. PA. L.
REv. 189 (1934) (emphasizing the need for rules in arbitration).
.45. See id. at 190.
46. See Letter from Constance O'Sullivan, AAA Director of Marketing, to author (Sept.
1, 1987).
47. See COMMERCIAL RULES, supra note 24. In an effort to further reduce the time and
expense associated with resolution of minor disputes, the AAA generally applies special "ex-
pedited procedures" in cases where no party's total claim exceeds $15,000. Id. §§ 7, 54-58.
Recently the AAA developed optional procedures for dealing with large or complex claims in
construction cases. AmHaIcAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, GUIDELINES FOR EXPEDITING LARGER,
COMPLEX CONSTRUCTION ARBITRATIONS (July 1987). See also infra note 319 (explaining new
guidelines).
48. The AAA Commercial Rules provide that arbitrators "authorized by law to subpoena
witnesses or documents may do so upon the request of any party or independently." COMIMRCIAL
RULES, supra note 24, § 31, at 11. In those cases where a pre-hearing conference (without the
arbitrators) is held, the parties may arrange among themselves "for an exchange of informa-
tion." See C. PETERSON, supra note 21, at 111-12. In large or complex cases where a preliminary
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Rules contain few strictures on the conduct of the hearings49 or the admission
of evidence, 0 leaving such matters largely to the discretion of the arbitrator."
Accordingly, the AAA authorizes the arbitrator to "grant any remedy or
relief that the arbitrator deems just and equitable and within the scope of
the agreement of the parties .... -52
By incorporating a degree of informality into the process, the AAA Rules
strive for several goals. Proponents of arbitration assert that businesspersons
are more comfortable with informal processes than with litigation, and that
they are therefore more likely to accept a result of an informal arbitration
process.53 A more informal, relaxed atmosphere may also be conducive to
a spirit of goodwill between the parties, a goal which may be important
when the parties share an ongoing commercial relationship.54 Keeping the
case out of court may also avoid unwanted publicity for one or both of the
parties.5 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the lack of formalities may
mean speedier, less expensive justice.5 6
2. A Knowledgeable and Experienced Trier of Fact
While the civil justice system often selects its triers of fact on the basis
that they know little or nothing about the subject of dispute, a hallmark of
hearing is scheduled before the arbitrators, the arbitrators and the parties may "arrange for
the production of relevant documents or other evidence." Id. However, the Rules are unclear
as to whether the arbitrators may subpoena documents or otherwise enforce discovery prior to
actual hearings. Id. AAA President Robert Coulson has been quoted as saying that arbitrators
rarely permit discovery. Meyerowitz, supra note 7, at 80. But see infra notes 319, 322.
49. See CoMmRcIAL RULES, supra note 24, §§ 21-40.
50. "The parties may offer such evidence as is relevant and material to the dispute ......
COMIERCtAL RUtLES, supra note 24, § 31.
51. The Rules provide that "It]he Arbitrator shall be the judge of the relevance and
materiality of the evidence offered and conformity to legal rules of evidence shall not be
necessary." COMMERcMAL RUtLs, supra note 24, § 31. Arbitrators thus have broad authority to
limit the evidence. See Poppleton, The Arbitrator's Role in Expediting the Large and Complex
Case, 36 ARB. J., Dec. 1981, at 6, 9. They also have considerable discretion to proceed forward
with hearings in the absence of a party, provided that party has been given notice and fails
to obtain an adjournment or to appear without good reason. ComOmRctA RULES, supra note
24, § 30. See generally Blutrich & Cuomo, The Discretion of Arbitrators to Grant or Deny
Adjournments, 38 ARB. J., Dec. 1983, at 36 (emphasizing the judicially-recognized authority
of arbitrators to control arbitration schedules).
52. ComMERcIL RUtLEs, supra note 24, § 43. The Rules also permit the Arbitrator to "assess
arbitration fees and expenses in favor of any party .... " Id.
53. See Jones, supra note 13, at 525 (noting that the arbitration process is often more
readily comprehensible to clients than civil litigation). See also Taeusch, supra note 4, at 148-
51 (describing the businessperson's "instinctive fear" of litigation).
54. Rosenthal, supra note 13, at 140. But see S. LAzRUs, supra note 1, at 56 (indicating
that goodwill is often not of paramount concern to businesspersons by the time a dispute
reaches arbitration).
In construction contracts, arbitration may be a means of successfully resolving disputes
while the work continues. Goldstein, supra note 4, at 79-80. See also Fabyanske & Halverson,
supra note 21, at 288. As the author can attest from personal experience, however, adversarial
processes of any kind may have a negative impact on an ongoing job.
55. S. LAzARus, supra note 1, at 53; Rosenthal, supra note 13, at 140.
56. See infra text accompanying notes 74-92.
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arbitration is the presence of one or more decisionmakers with pertinent
knowledge or experience. 57 The theory is that an individual familiar with the
commercial context of the dispute, including industry customs and vocab-
ulary, is better suited to dispense justice than laypersons who might be
hampered by their relative lack of business experience and understanding of
trade practices.58
At the hearing stage, arbitrator knowledge and experience may be critical
in a number of ways. Expert arbitrators should require little in the way of
education on technical points, thereby saving valuable hearing time.5 9 More-
over, a pertinent technical or legal background should enhance the ability
of the arbitrator to identify the significant issues in a particular case and
to sharpen the focus of the hearing to deal with those issues. 6 A knowl-
edgeable arbitrator may be able to prevent unnecessary delay where an
advocate's ignorance or lack of preparedness leads to unhelpful lines of
questioning. 61
57. See Lyons, supra note 20, at 107 (quoting AAA President Robert Coulson as saying
that "people choose arbitration mainly to have something resolved in a private setting by people
who are knowledgeable ... [so that] the parties can get an award that is final and binding").
See also Rosenthal, supra note 13, at 140.
58. See Bernstein, The Impact of the Uniform Commercial Code upon Arbitration: Rev-
olutionary Overthrow or Peaceful Coexistence., 22 ARB. J., Aug!' 1967, at 65, 82 (observing
that businesspersons and others often distrust the law and judges, and would prefer to depend
upon the judgment of businesspersons and other experts); Goldstein, supra note 4, at 80; Note,
supra note 4, at 1028 ("Because of their expert knowledge of trade practices, arbitrators are
regarded as more competent finders of fact than jurors."); Phillips, A Practical Method for
the Determination of Business Fact, 82 U. PA. L. REv. 230, 234 (1934) (suggesting that even
if jury trials were speedier, many would still prefer to have disputes resolved by an expert
arbitrator); Taeusch, supra note 4, at 158-59 (asserting that businesspersons prefer a quick,
fair and final disposition of controversies by arbitrators). See also Ferguson, The Adjudication
of Commercial Disputes and the Legal System in Modern England, 7 Br. J.L. & Soc. 141,
142-44, 147 (1980) (discussing concerns of English business interests with the unpredictability
of jury verdicts, and the movement toward arbitration before expert arbitrators); Scheinholtz
& Miscimarra, The Arbitrator as Judge and Jury: Another Look at Statutory Law in Arbitration,
40 ARa. J., June 1985, at 55, 57 (noting the importance and value of having knowledgeable
and experienced arbitrators in labor disputes).
59. See Solove, supra note 21, at 134; Taeusch, supra note 4, at 150.
60. The ability of the arbitrator to define issues may be critical in the absence of extensive
preliminary discovery and motion practice. See Barrett, Arbitration of a Complex Commercial
Case: Practical Guidelines for Arbitrators and Counsel, 41 ARB. J., Dec. 1986, at 15, 18-19;
Mentschikoff, supra note 1, at 705-06. According to a number of decisions, an arbitrator who
has been selected for his familiarity with and knowledge of the specific subject matter of the
arbitration may rely heavily upon his own expertise in reaching a decision. See Horowitz, supra
note 13, at 82. See also Isaacs, supra note 36, at 937 (observing that arbitrators may draw
upon their own technical knowledge and expertise in arriving at a decision); Mentschikoff,
supra note 1, at 701 (describing the expansion of "judicial notice" made possible by arbitrator
expertise); Phillips, supra note 58, at 241-42.
61. See Horowitz, supra note 13, at 83 (noting the propensity of some arbitrators to question
witnesses themselves). See also Construction Experts Assess Arbitration's Changing Tenor, 54
Crvt ENG./ASCE, Sept. 1984, at 16 (concluding that construction arbitration requires careful
preparation and understanding of technical' points of case because arbitrators are experts in
the field).
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Arbitrator expertise should reduce the possibility that the final decision
will be arbitrary or ill-informed. 62 Arbitrators with pertinent commercial
background and understanding should also be less susceptible to lawyer
artifice or to emotion.63 And while arbitrators may pay heed to principles
of substantive law, 64 they may elect to forego a strict contractual interpre-
tation which, given their own experience, is inconsistent with justice in the
instant case.65 An arbitrator's expertise in a case is usually not an accident.
The parties typically participate in selecting the arbitrator or arbitrators and
they may establish criteria which the panelists must meet. 66 The role of the
parties in the selection process thus permits the fashioning of a tribunal
appropriate to the case. 67 It may also stimulate greater faith in the process
and lessen the chance of appeal of the final award.68
Although arbitrating parties may select their own panel without outside
assistance, they frequently resort to an institutional selection process such
62. Mentschikoff concluded that a factor enhancing the predictability of arbitration was
arbitrator awareness of trade meaning of contract terms and the significance of various aspects
of performance under the contract. Mentschikoff, supra note 2, at 853. See also Jones, supra
note 13, at 525 ("It is one thing to offer the testimony of competent expert witnesses [as in
court]; it is quite another to infuse the decision-reaching with such expertise.").
63. See S. LAzARus, supra note 1, at 52. See also Bernstein, supra note 58, at 82 ("Nonexpert
judges can be misled about questions of business practice . .'..").
64. Studies indicate that commercial arbitrators generally pay attention to, if not follow,
applicable legal precedent. See Mentschikoff, supra note 2, at 861; Note, supra note 4, at 1024,
1027; infra text accompanying note 258. Although arbitrators do not have judges to instruct
them in the law, they may be informed of pertinent legal norms by counsel. Mentschikoff,
supra note 2, at 867-68.
65. See Bernstein, supra note 58, at 84 (observing that while it is to be expected "[t]hat
arbitrators frequently seek guidance from the law ... [e]qually, it is to be expected that they
not feel constrained by it"); Lippman, Arbitration as an Alternative to Judicial Settlement:
Some Selected Perspectives, 24 ME. L. REv. 215, 218 (1972) (concluding that parties selecting
arbitration are choosing a forum in which they believe "fundamental equities" will prevail
over technical precedent); Solove, supra note 21, at 137 (noting that arbitrators may "develop
private principles of decision or remedial devices which, while satisfactory to the parties, would
not normally be administered by the courts"). See also Goldstein, supra note 4, at 79-80.
Professor Mentschikoff observed that while legal precedent did have a meaning in arbitration,
arbitrators were free to use other criteria as the basis of their decision and to retest pertinent
rules of law on the basis of their "inherent soundness." Mentschikoff, supra note 1, at 701-
03. She concluded that courts often achieve these same goals by subterfuge. Id. See also infra
note 154.
66. See Solove, supra note 21, at 137.
67. See Coulson, Arbitration in the Eighties: Make It Work for You, 17 FoRUM 673 (1982)
(describing arbitrator selection as "the most critical step in arbitration"); Mentschikoff, supra
note 2, at 862-63 (describing party control over or participation in arbitrator selection as offering
an enormous advantage over litigation). See also Foster, Practical Tips in Presenting a Con-
struction Arbitration Case, PRoc. LrrG. SEc. A.B.A. 338, 338-40 (1981) (dealing with selection
of arbitrators in construction cases); Popkin, Practical Problems Confronting the Practicing
Lawyer, 17 LAW & CoNraEMl. PROBS. 652, 653-54 (1952) (discussing arbitrator selection strategies
in commercial cases).
68. See Coulson, supra note 67, at 675; Solove, supra note 21, at 137.
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as that established by the AAA Rules. 69 The AAA maintains nationwide
panels of arbitrators for selection in various kinds of cases, including com-
mercial disputes and construction-related controversies. 70 Theoretically, the
panelists are individuals with pertinent technical or legal knowledge, edu-
cation or experience. 71 Because it is often difficult to find individual panelists
incorporating all of the personal and professional strengths that may be
important to the resolution of a dispute, the AAA Rules permit the use of
a three-member panel in appropriate cases; 72 in construction cases, such
panels are frequently composed of a contractor, a design professional and
an attorney. 73
3. Speed and Efficiency in the Arbitration Process
In a period of increasing dissatisfaction with the delays of the judicial
system, arbitration purportedly offers a more expeditious and efficient method
of resolving civil disputes.74 This advantage is theoretically obtained through
a combination of factors at various stages of the process.
The relative absence of pre-arbitration motion practice or discovery may
be the single most important factor in reducing the length of arbitration.75
There is generally no opportunity for attorneys to consume months or years
exchanging lengthy and detailed pleadings, making and arguing technical
motions involving points of law, and conducting extensive discovery.
Moreover, in arbitration there is no need to put up with the delays and
uncertainties of a court docket; in many cases it is possible to begin hearings
69. The standard arbitrator selection procedure used by the AAA involves the submission
to the parties of lists of potential arbitrators from the appropriate AAA pool. See infra text
accompanying notes 133-34.
70. See generally F. IELLOR, supra note 23, at 31-36 (describing the administration of AAA
panels). See also Meisel, supra note 13, at 8 (discussing national AAA construction panel and
specialty panels).
71. See Meyerowitz, supra note 13, at 79.
72. AAA President Coulson believes that the panel approach offers a "collective expertise"
that might not be obtainable in a single individual. Coulson, supra note 67, at 675. Since
August 1987, the AAA has a policy of appointing three arbitrators in cases involving claims
in excess of $100,000. Telephone interview with George H. Friedman, AAA Vice President for
Case Administration (Nov. 24, 1987).
73. See Aksen, supra note 13, at 158-59 (describing the efforts of the AAA and the National
Construction Industry Arbitration Committee, which jointly developed the multidisciplinary
concept to foster expertise and fairness). Compare Smiley, Stockbroker-Customer Disputes:
Making a Case for Arbitration, 23 GA. ST. B.J. 195, 198 (1987) (discussing multidisciplinary
structure of panels in arbitration under the auspices of the National Association of Securities
Dealers and various securities regulatory organizations).
74. See Aksen, supra note 13, at 158; Jones, supra note 13, at 525; Max, supra note 4, at
311; Mentschikoff, supra note 1, at 703; Meyerowitz, supra note 13, at 80; Rosenthal, supra
note 13, at 139; Sergi, supra note 4, at 43; Taeusch, supra note 4, at 150 n.7; Note, supra
note 4, at 1022; Note, Litigation or Arbitration, supra note 3, at 255.
75. See C. PETERSON, supra note 21, at 107; Sergi, supra note 4, at 44; Note, Litigation
or Arbitration, supra note 3, at 256.
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as soon as the arbitrators are appointed3 6 In litigation, the advent of evi-
dentiary hearings prompts many parties to negotiate their differences; if the
same holds true in arbitration, the prompt scheduling of hearings may bring
the parties to the bargaining table all the more quickly. 7 Therefore, in
addition to hastening the ultimate conclusion of formal dispute resolution,
the lack of pre-arbitration procedure may in some cases stimulate more rapid
settlement of controversies.
At the hearing stage, the absence of formal rules governing the admission
of oral testimony and documentary evidence may reduce hearing time2 8
Testimony may be given in narrative form, and occasionally by affidavit.7 9
Cumulative or redundant testimony may be restricted or forbidden,80 while
photocopies of documents may be routinely admitted as evidence."' Objec-
tions will probably be discouraged. Furthermore, in the interest of bringing
the hearings to a more rapid conclusion, arbitration sessions may continue
into the evening hoursA2 Under the AAA Rules, an arbitrator may press
forward with scheduled hearings even in the absence of a party who, after
having been given due notice, fails to be present or obtain an adjournment."'
The arbitral award is generally assailable only on very limited grounds
such as fraud or denial of a hearing. 4 Courts typically will not pry into the
factual or legal conclusions of arbitrators.s Even when undertaken, judicial
review is difficult because arbitrators' decisions seldom contain any sup-
porting rationale; the AAA encourages its commercial arbitrators to limit
their award to a statement of relief given and to avoid a lengthy explanation. 86
76. See Sergi, supra note 4, at 44.
77. See Lempert, supra note 10, at 2, col. 1 (noting the success of court-annexed arbitration
in stimulating earlier settlement of actions in federal district courts).
78. See Solove, supra note 21, at 137.
79. See Poppleton, supra note 51, at 8. The AAA Rules permit the arbitrator to receive
and consider affidavits, which are to be given "only such weight as the Arbitrator deems it
entitled to after consideration of any objections made to its admission." ComnMRcUL RULEs,
supra note 24, § 32.
80. See Faure, supra note 1, at 210-11.
81. See Poppleton, supra note 51, at 7.
82. See Sergi, supra note 4, at 44-45 (suggesting that arbitrations may be conducted after
business hours so as to avoid interference with work).
83. See supra note 51.
84. See generally Stipanowich, supra note 1, at 982-86 (offering a general treatment of
judicial review of arbitration awards). Judicial review is generally restricted to limited grounds
described by state or federal statutes. See id. at 984. See also Jones, supra note 13, at 547-51.
Although Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953), is cited for the proposition that arbitral
awards may be vacated for "manifest disregard of the law," that standard is rarely applied
to overturn an award. See Stipanowich, supra note 1, at 985. See also Sergi, supra note 4, at
44-45. The same is true of the judicially-declared standard of "complete irrationality." See
Jones, supra note 13, at 551; Stipanowich, supra note 1, at 985.
85. See Stipanowich, supra note 1, at 983-84.
86. See id. at 983. The AAA seems to have adopted the principle of Occam's Razor-that
is, that the least possible explanation is the best. See C. REnmAR, TBE LAW OF m LAND 105
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These limitations on review are consistent with the notion that, for better
or worse, the parties have bargained for arbitral justice without judicial
intervention.8 7 They serve to put an effective end to dispute resolution,
preventing a case from dragging on for months or years in the appeal stage. s8
4. Economies of the Arbitration Process
Arbitration provides several perceived economic advantages over the civil
justice system. For example, abbreviated prehearing practice, shorter hearing
time, and limited opportunities for successful appeal in arbitration may result
in smaller expenditures for legal services than the litigation of a similar
controversy. 89 Likewise, arbitration may provide an economic savings to a
business because it diverts fewer internal resources; particularly in small
companies which depend upon the productive efforts of a few key personnel,
preoccupation with lengthy litigation may have a serious impact on company
business.
Another potential economic benefit of arbitration relates to interest on
amounts claimed. A shortcoming of the civil justice system is that aggrieved
parties are rarely fully compensated for the loss of the use value of money
owed. 90 Unless claims are fully liquidated, no interest on sums owed will
accrue until judgment; even then, the statutory rate of interest may not
approximate the investment value of the principal. To the extent arbitration
shortens the time to an enforceable judgment, it reduces the lost interest
factor.
Finally, the use of consensual arbitration also represents cost savings to
the public. Cases which would otherwise have burdened the court system
are effectively channeled into a private process of dispute resolution. 9 The
costs of arbitration are borne by the parties. 92
(1980). See also Mentschikoff, supra note 2, at 866 (observing that not being required to write
an opinion considerably simplifies the arbitrator's job and permits multi-member panels, like
juries, to arrive at a decision without agreeing upon a rationale); Taeusch, supra note 4, at
158 (arguing that businesspersons would prefer to have no reasons given in support of an
award, for though the decision may be good the reasons may not be).
87. See Stipanowich, supra note 1, at 983. See also Poor, Arbitration Under the Federal
Statute, 36 YALE L.J. 667, 676 (1927) (arguing that "a right to review by the courts adds
considerably to the potential expense and is, in substance, adding a fifth wheel to the wagon").
88. Jones, supra note 13, at 525.
89. See Aksen, supra note 13; Faure, supra note 1, at 206-07; Jones, supra note 13, at
525; Max, supra note 4, at 311; Meyerowitz, supra note 13, at 80; Sergi, supra note 4, at 45;
Taeusch, supra note 4, at 150 & n.7.
90. See Max, supra note 4, at 309.
91. Faure, supra note 1, at 206.
92. Id. at 206-07.
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B. The Other Side of the Coin:
Concerns Regarding the Arbitration Process
Critics of arbitration have observed that arbitration often fails to meet
popular expectations. 9 Others see its purported attributes as serious defi-
ciencies, with dire consequences for the establishment and enforcement of
societal norms.Y Even adherents of the process acknowledge that the per-
ceived blessings of arbitration may occasionally prove to be a bane.95 As a
system founded on private agreement, largely independent of the judicial
process, arbitration has built-in limitations which must be recognized and
addressed whenever it is considered as an alternative form of dispute reso-
lution. Some limitations, such as those associated with procedural or mul-
tiparty issues, are a by-product of arbitration's roots in contract. Other less
foreseeable limitations may arise as a result of the flexibility inherent in the
process and the degree to which it depends upon the cooperation of the
parties and the personal qualities of those who administer the case.
1. Problems of Formality and Procedure
a. Preliminary Hurdles
Regardless of the care with which an arbitration agreement has been
structured, getting to arbitration may prove a major hurdle. Resort to judicial
processes may be necessary to address various preliminary issues. These issues
include the enforceability of the arbitration provision, the arbitrability of
the dispute, compliance with preconditions to arbitration, waiver of the right
to arbitrate, and problems relating to multiparty disputes.
93. See Bayer & Abrahams, supra note 20 (enumerating the "many well-tested and time-
honored protections [which] are not available in arbitration"); Hart, supra note 20 (depicting
arbitration as an inferior and disadvantageous means of resolving construction disputes); Lyons,
supra note 20 (detailing a marathon arbitration which failed to provide any of the advertised
benefits of the process); Phillips, supra note 58, at 239 n.35 (labelling much of the literature
favorable to arbitration as "propaganda"); Phillips, supra note 20 (cautioning that arbitration
is a specialized process of limited utility, and not a wholesale substitute for the judicial process);
Poor, supra note 87, at 676 (suggesting that many cases are more appropriate for litigation).
94. Professor Kronstein expressed the concern that if courts "abdicate their power in favor
of private tribunals," it would be impossible "to maintain any legally established policy or
order" in domestic or international commerce. Kronstein, supra note 2, at 699. See also
Mentschikoff, supra note 2, at 868 (questioning the ability of arbitrators to maintain appropriate
behavioral norms through personal notions of equity).
There is substantial agreement that as a system unbound by precedent and largely free from
judicial oversight, arbitration may be better suited to resolution of factual disputes than cases
turning on subtle legal theories. See Fabyanske & Halverson, supra note 21, at 288-89; Phillips,
supra note 20, at 41. See also Horowitz, supra note 13, at 75-76.
95. See generally Horowitz, supra note 13 (offering a practicing attorney's concerns with
the process). See also Lurie, supra note 4, at 9.
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A common preliminary hurdle for the party desiring to arbitrate is the
other party's refusal to participate in the process. 96 While modern arbitration
statutes generally provide a means for enforcing agreements to arbitrate by
authorizing courts to stay related litigation, compel arbitration or both, 97
there are bases upon which a court may refuse to do so. If it can be
demonstrated that the agreement to arbitrate was induced by fraud, mis-
representation, or duress, or if the agreement would operate in an uncon-
scionable manner, or would otherwise be unenforceable under general contract
principles, arbitration may be avoided. 9s Moreover, courts may refuse to
enforce arbitration of particular kinds of contract-related claims, including
statute-based antitrust and securities claims, on grounds of public policy.99
"Arbitrability" may be challenged on the grounds that particular claims
or controversies fall outside the scope of the parties' arbitration agreement.10
96. Both at the prehearing stage and later in the process, lack of cooperation may frustrate
the goals of speed and economy. Bayer & Abrahams, supra note 20, at 30 ("Nonjudicial dispute
resolution requires cooperation ... at a time when there is likely to be no cooperation.");
Lennard, Arbitrating Without Litigating, 40 CAL. ST. B.J. 692 (1968) ("Non-participation may
stymie arbitration at one or all of three stages: selecting the neutral arbitrator, appearing and
proceeding before him, and complying with his award."); Middleton, supra note 28, at 785-
86 ("[People] have to want to arbitrate. If people [do not] have the commitment, the process
is really less effective than [judicial resolution] . . . ."). As in litigation, experienced attorneys
may find numerous opportunities to delay the process through interposition of technical ar-
guments. Horowitz, supra note 13, at 70; Phillips, supra note 20, at 38; Poor, supra note 87,
at 669-70. As one judge observed: "Arbitration is often thought of as a quick and efficient
method for determining controversies. Unfortunately, cases involving arbitration clauses some-
times are best remembered as monuments to delay because of the litigation and appeals
antecedent to the actual arbitration." Standard Chlorine, Inc. v. Leonard, 384 F.2d 304, 305
(2d Cir. 1967). For a thorough discussion of "tiers" of pre-arbitration procedural delay under
federal and state statutes in Pennsylvania, see Comisky & Comisky, supra note 13, at 460-92.
97. See, e.g., 9 U.S.C. §§ 3,4; UNIt. APB. ACT § 2, 7 U.L.A. 1, 68 (1985).
98. The Federal Arbitration Act provides generally for the enforceability of agreements to
arbitrate, "save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract." 14 U.S.C. § 2. The Uniform Arbitration Act contains a similar exception. UNIF.
ARB. ACT § 1, 7 U.L.A. 1, 5 (1985). See DoMKE, supra note 1, at 89-102. See also Arbitration
Is Simpler Than Litigation: Myth or Reality?, 4 FRANcmsE L.J. 10 (1985) (noting procedural
challenges to arbitration in franchise cases). But see Note, The Consequences of a Broad
Arbitration Clause Under the Federal Arbitration Act, supra note 2, at 571 (observing that
"[t]oday, the legal and equitable defenses available to a party seeking to avoid a contract are
partially or entirely unavailable to a party attempting to defend himself against a motion to
arbitrate").
99. See generally Sterk, Enforceability of Agreements to Arbitrate: An Examination of the
Public Policy Defense, 2 CARDozo L. REv. 481, 542-43 (1981) (addressing the various circum-
stances in which courts have considered public policy challenges to enforceability of arbitration
agreements). In light of the strong public policies favoring broad enforcement of arbitration
clauses, however, courts are reluctant to deny such enforcement except in the presence of
exceptional countervailing policies. Stipanowich, supra note 1, at 988-89. Recent decisions by
the Supreme Court have resolved a number of significant arbitrability issues in favor of
arbitration. See supra note 3.
100. See generally DomE, supra note 1, at 151-59 (discussing arbitrability issues). See
Brenner, Arbitration: Compulsion and Avoidance, 17 FORUM 656, 664-65 (1982) (observing that
arbitration provisions of limited scope invite litigation). See also Arbitration Is Simpler Than
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Moreover, parties sometimes include in their contracts certain preconditions
to arbitration; 0' a failure to comply with these preconditions may be asserted
by a party wishing to avoid arbitration. 0 2 Yet another basis for challenging
the right to arbitrate is waiver by the party seeking to enforce arbitration. 03
Gaps in the arbitration agreement may require judicial intervention. For
example, occasionally the failure of the parties to agree upon an arbitrator
or upon the process by which the arbitrator shall be selected requires a court
to step in to resolve the issue. °4
A far more common procedural problem, judging by the number of
reported cases, arises in the presence of multiple parties to the dispute.105
While modern rules of court serve to accommodate multiparty controver-
sies,'06 arbitration statutes and rules do not generally address the procedures
to be followed in such cases. 1°7 Because most jurisdictions routinely enforce
arbitration agreements even if they fail to bind all of the disputants, the
likely result will be multiple proceedings. 0 Even if all parties have arbitration
clauses in their contracts, there is no guarantee that they will be directed to
a single forum. ° 9
b. Problems at the Hearing Stage
Once arbitration begins, the informality of the process may produce frus-
trations for those who are accustomed to traditional civil process. The relative
Litigation: A Myth or Reality, supra note 98, at 10 (discussing scope issues under arbitration
provisions in franchise agreements).
In order to minimize scope-related arbitrability questions, the AAA generally recommends
incorporating a "broad-form" arbitration clause in commercial agreements that mandates
arbitration of "[a]ny controversy or claim arising out of or relating to" the contract. COM-
MaRcAL RuLEs, supra note 24, at 2. Some commentators, however, believe that the risk of
challenges to arbitrability are outweighed by the need to specifically tailor such provisions to
limit the scope of arbitration to those types of disputes which arbitrators are best equipped to
resolve. See, e.g., S. LAzAMus, supra note 1, at 118-20, 187.
In the absence of pertinent contract language there may be confusion as to the proper forum
for resolution of scope-related arbitrability questions. Courts tend to reserve to themselves
questions regarding the scope of arbitration agreements in the absence of contract language
giving such authority to the arbitrators. Doinc, supra note 1, at 152-55.
101. For example, many contracts set forth specific time limits for submitting a demand for
arbitration. See DoKE, supra note 1, at 229-34.
102. See id.
103. See id. at 275-81.
104. See 9 U.S.C. § 5; UNiF. ARB. ACT § 3, 7 U.L.A. 1, 96 (1985).
105. See generally Stipanowich, Arbitration and the Multiparty Dispute: The Search for
Workable Solutions, 72 IowA L. REv. 473 (1987) (offering a comprehensive review and analysis
of decisions considering procedural issues arising in multiparty disputes in the presence of one
or more contractual agreements to arbitrate). See also Fabyanske & Halverson, supra note 21,
at 283-86 (discussing multiparty disputes when construction contracts are involved).
106. See Stipanowich, supra note 105, at 473-75.
107. See id. at 474-75.
108. See id. at 480-86.
109. See id. at 491-93.
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absence of prehearing discovery and detailed pleadings may mean that a
party comes to the hearings without a complete understanding of the char-
acter of the opposition's case, let alone knowledge of what documents are
to be relied upon or what witnesses are to be called." 0 In such cases,
arbitration threatens to become "trial by surprise"-a situation reminiscent
of litigation in the days before the Field Code."'
The failure to define disputed issues at the prehearing stage may have a
dramatic impact on the presentation of evidence and the final resolution of
the dispute. The parties may, through inadvertence or ignorance, introduce
considerable evidence on irrelevant or extraneous points while failing to
address important issues12 The arbitrators, having had little or no oppor-
tunity to familiarize themselves with the dispute prior to the hearing, may
understandably be reluctant to limit the evidence in any way because of the
fear of excluding what may turn out to be material evidence."' In some
cases, confusion may even permeate the arbitrators' final award." 4
Difficulties may also arise when arbitrators are required to deal with
procedural issues which are not specifically addressed by the arbitration
rules. Particularly where the arbitrators are without experience in other forms
110. See Bayer & Abrahams, supra note 20, at 31 (observing that arbitrating parties have
little opportunity to understand or limit the issues prior to hearings); Meyerowitz, supra note
13, at 80 (noting that some attorneys are concerned that lack of discovery may make it more
difficult for some clients to prove their case in arbitration).
Also, because discovery frequently stimulates settlement by revealing to parties the weaknesses
of their own position and the strengths of their opponent's argument, the relative absence of
discovery in arbitration may be at least partly responsible for the lower rate of prehearing
settlement in arbitration. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LrnoAIoN, SECOND 164 (1985) (discussing
the importance of discovery as a stimulus to settlement in litigation); Kritzer & Anderson,
supra note 21, at II (comparing prehearing settlement rates in litigation and arbitration).
For a general discussion of discovery in commercial arbitration, see C. P=rEsoN, supra note
21, at 107-11; Willenken, Discovery in Aid of Arbitration, 6 Lrri., Winter 1980, at 16. See
also Callahan, Discovery in Construction of Arbitration, 37 ARE. J., Mar. 1982, at 3.
111. The absence of discovery causes some attorneys to perceive the outcome of arbitration
as less predictable than litigation. S. LAZARUs, supra note 1, at 116. One commentator recently
cautioned that many owners are avoiding arbitration because of the difficulty of trying to
defend against contractor claims without access to contractor cost records through discovery.
Wilkinson, The Decline and Fall of Arbitration, 4 KC-NEws, Apr. 1987, at 2. See also Lurie,
supra note 4, at 9.
112. Especially in large or complex cases, the complete absence of discovery often tempts
attorneys to use cross-examination as a substitute for depositions; they may also feel compelled
to request a continuance in order to conduct document discovery. See infra notes 165-66 and
accompanying text.
113. A refusal to hear relevant or material testimony may constitute grounds for vacating
the arbitration award. Aksen, supra note 13, at 160. See 9 U.S.C. § 10(c); UNwi. ARa. ACT §
12(a)(4), 7 U.L.A. 1, 140 (1985). See also infra notes 162-64 and accompanying text. One
experienced attorney/arbitrator posits that "it is ... far more effective ... to volunteer
complete and all-encompassing discovery [prior to hearings] in order to minimize the hearing
time for the arbitrators (and your client)." FosTER, supra note 67, at 341.
114. See Mentschikoff, supra note 2, at 865 n.32. See also infra notes 154-56 and accom-
panying text.
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of hearings, matters such as the issuance of subpoenas, the handling of third
party claims, and the admission of evidence may present considerable dif-
ficulty.",
c. Lawyer-Injected Formalities
While attorneys tend to complain about certain formal inadequacies of
arbitration, many in the business community feel that the most significant
problem with modern arbitration is the increasing formalization of the proc-
ess brought about by the legal profession.11 6 Many charge that in their zeal
to make arbitration a carbon copy of traditional litigation, lawyers have
robbed the process of its essential attributes. 17
It is to be expected that, even in arbitration, persons with training in case
presentation in the courts would rely upon their experiences as advocates.
Indeed, there are certain features of litigation which, when transferred to
arbitration, further the basic goals of arbitration by lending order and
efficiency to the process."' On the other hand, there is evidence that lawyer-
induced prearbitration motion practice, insistence upon the observance of
technical rules of evidence, and confrontational mindset have caused many
to resent the presence of attorneys." 9 Some have gone so far as to suggest
that attorneys be banned from arbitration,' 2° a procedure long followed by
certain trade groups. 121
d. The Problem of Arbitrator Remedies
Although arbitrators generally are authorized to grant any relief appro-
priate to the circumstances (within the limits -of the parties' arbitration
115. Such concerns have prompted the AAA to encourage the participation of attorneys in
arbitration. See infra note 118 and accompanying text.
116. A number of commentators have remarked upon the trend toward greater formality in
commercial arbitration, a tendency generally attributed to the influence of the bar. See S.
LAzguws, supra note 1, at 22, 66; Angel, The Use of Arbitration Clauses as a Means for the
Resolution of Impasses Arising in the Negotiation of, or During the Life of, Long-Term
Contractual Relationships, 28 Bus. LAw. 589 (1973); Middleton, supra note 28, at 786.
117. Notions that attorneys tend to delay the arbitration process are supported by empirical
data from several sources. See infra notes 253, 256 and accompanying text.
118. The AAA generally employs attorneys as arbitrators because of their knowledge of the
law and experience with dispute resolution procedures. It also encourages their use as advocates
in arbitration. See Gotshal, A Symposium on Arbitration, 10 VAND. L. Rnv. 649 (1957). AAA
President Robert Coulson has observed that while attorney-arbitrators are often accused of
bringing unnecessary formality to the process and of being overly domineering, lawyers with
pertinent expertise in the subject area of the dispute may be valuable because of their familiarity
with the hearing process and their relative impartiality. Coulson, supra note 67, at 674.
119. See Arbitration Agony, supra note 4, at 59 (describing concerns among members of
the construction industry with attorney-arbitrators); Keep Arbitration Simple, ENG. NEws Rc.,
Mar. 3, 1983, at 64 (observing that attorneys without pertinent technical expertise were finding
their way onto construction panels, and turning arbitration into "pseudo-court" proceedings).
120. See Arbitration Agony, supra note 4, at 59.
121. Mentschikoff, supra note 2, at 857. See also Coulson, supra note 67, at 674 (discussing
arbitration in the textile trade).
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agreement), 22 situations exist in which a court will refuse to enforce an
arbitral award even though the same remedy might have been available in
court. For example, in some jurisdictions punitive damages are not recov-
erable in arbitration. 2 Likewise, a number of state arbitration acts prohibit
arbitrators from awarding attorney's fees in the absence of specific agreement
by the parties. 24
Another set of concerns stems from the fact that arbitrators usually do
not have the authority to enforce their own awards. Ambiguities in the award
may make it difficult for a court to enforce, particularly in the case of
orders of specific performance or injunctive relief.' 2'
Finally, questions arise as a result of the requirement that the award of
the arbitration panel be "final" before a court will enforce it.126 If an
arbitration panel considers it necessary or appropriate to issue an interim
order enjoining certain actions by a party or upholding the status quo under
a contract, the "finality" requirement raises concerns regarding the enforce-
ability of such an order. 27
122. According to the AAA Commercial Rules, an "arbitrator may grant any remedy or
relief that the arbitrator deems just and equitable and within the scope of the agreement of
the parties, including, but not limited to, specific performance of a contract." COMMERCIAL
RULES, supra note 24, § 43. For a general discussion of the remedy-making authority of
arbitrators and related limits on judicial review of awards, see Stipanowich, supra note 1, at
978-88.
123. The trend of recent decisions, however, appears to be in the direction of permitting
arbitrators to frame such awards. See Stipanowich, supra note 1, at 983. See also Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985) (discussed supra note 3);
Ex Parte Cost & Head Atrium Ltd., 486 So. 2d 1272 (Ala. 1986).
124. The Uniform Arbitration Act provides that "lu]nless otherwise provided in the agreement
to arbitrate, the arbitrators' expenses and fees, together with other expenses, not including
counsel fees, incurred in the conduct of the arbitration, shall be paid as provided in the award."
UNno. ARB. ACT § 10, 7 U.L.A. 1, 131 (1985). The New York arbitration statute contains
almost identical language. N.Y. Crv. PRAc. L. & R. § 713 (McKinney 1980). Arguably, under
such statutes attorney's fees are not awardable by arbitrators except where the parties have
specifically provided for such awards in their arbitration agreement. DossaE, supra note 1, at
535-39. An exception may be made where it can be demonstrated that there exists separate
statutory authority for such awards. See, e.g., Kamakazi Music Corp. v. Robbins Music Corp.,
684 F.2d 228, 231 (2d Cir. 1982) (permitting recovery of attorney's fees under the authority
of the Copyright Act, reasoning that the New York arbitration act did "not bar the award of
attorney's fees; it merely [did] not grant authority to do so").
On the other hand, since arbitration awards are frequently for less than the amount claimed
and rarely contain an itemization of damages, attorney's fees may be included in the award
without the parties knowing it. Richter & Kozek, Construction Arbitration Procedures: Basic
Principles and Guidelines, No. 78-5 CONSTRUCTION BRIaENGS (Federal Publications, Inc.) at
10 (1978) (supplement to -Tm CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTOR and THE GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR).
125. See, e.g., Island Creek Coal Sales Co. v. City of Gainesville, 764 F.2d 437 (6th Cir.
1985), aff'g with exception and condition noted, 729 F.2d 1046 (1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
948 (1985). For a discussion of this topic, see Stipanowich, supra note 3, at 348-53.
126. See generally DomKa, supra note 1, at 421-22 (discussing employment of a "full settle-
ment" clause in awards).
127. Although the AAA Commercial Rules do not generally empower arbitrators to order
relief in the nature of a temporary injunction, arbitrators may "issue such orders as may be
deemed necessary to safeguard the property which is the subject matter of the arbitration ......
COMMERCIAL RULES, supra note 24, § 34.
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e. Concerns Regarding the Preservation of Privacy
While arbitrations are less likely to be the subject of press coverage than
civil litigation, publicity may attend preliminary court proceedings or judicial
appeals of arbitration awards.'2 And while members of the press may be
excluded from arbitration hearings, they still have opportunities to gather
information if a dispute is particularly newsworthy; there is nothing to keep
a party who wishes a controversy to be made public from going to the news
media with details of the dispute. Moreover, although a party may be
protected to some degree from the collateral estoppel effects of an award
in third party litigation, 29 it may still be possible for third parties to obtain
transcripts of sworn testimony from the arbitration for use in later pro-
ceedings.
2. Concerns Regarding Arbitrator Selection and Competence
a. Concerns Regarding the Selection Process
Although decisionmaking by party-appointed experts is perceived as a
significant advantage of arbitration, 30 critics assert that in many cases, the
selection process fails to produce capable arbitrators.' 31 While it is possible
for parties to agree among themselves on the designation of one or more
individuals as arbitrators, a more common approach is to depend upon
institutional selection procedures. 32 Under the AAA Rules, the preferred
process involves selection of arbitrators from panels developed by the As-
sociation. 33 The AAA forwards a list of names to the parties with a brief
description of each individual's background and expertise and the parties
each strike all potential arbitrators they deem unsuitable. If the parties are
unable to agree upon mutually acceptable panelists, the AAA administrator
may forward another list of candidates to the parties or unilaterally appoint
arbitrators to fill out the panel.134
Unfortunately, AAA panelists vary considerably in experience and ability.
It is possible that an individual whose name appears on the AAA panel was
128. Phillips, supra note 20, at 39; Solove, supra note 21, at 137.
129. See generally Doi=., supra note 1, at 452-55 (discussing the res judicata effect of an
arbitration award); Res Judicata in Arbitration, 3 LAw. ARB. LETTER 1-5 (1979) (summarizing
pertinent cases).
130. See supra notes 57-73 and accompanying text.
131. See Bayer & Abrahams, supra note 20, at 31; Middleton, supra note 28, at 785. See
also I.N. DuNcA VAIAcE, supra note 20, at 269-70, 396.
132. See supra note 24.
133. COM M MRCAL Ruts, supra note 24, § 13. See also id. §§ 14, 15 (setting forth alternative
methods of selection including direct appointment by the parties).
134. Id. § 13.
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appointed to the list on his or her own motion without training or experience
with arbitration.
Although the parties are given summary biographical information about
panel members, that description is based on information provided by the
would-be arbitrators and is not subject to routine verification by the AAA.'
The description may thus misrepresent a person's pertinent background and
qualifications: for example, a panelist described as a "construction lawyer"
may be a real estate expert without experience in construction-related mat-
ters.' 36 Also, because the AAA has not routinely updated arbitrator records,
the information on the card may be out of date. Finally, the data card may
reveal little or nothing about the individual's history as an arbitrator.' 37
The AAA admonishes parties to perform their own investigations of pro-
spective arbitrators. 8 This can be a costly and time-consuming process,
however, particularly when the individuals being investigated live and work
in distant places. Moreover, discussions with colleagues or acquaintances
may answer few questions about the effectiveness of a particular person as
an arbitrator; without names of parties or attorneys who have such infor-
mation to share, personal investigations may reveal relatively little pertinent
data. '39
Another potential difficulty with the selection process is the AAA tribunal
administrator-the person charged with responsibility for overseeing the
selection of arbitrators and forwarding of communications between the par-
ties and the panel. 140 It is the administrator who receives the initial case
filings from the parties and selects names of potential arbitrators for their
approval. If the parties are unable to agree upon arbitrators, the choice is
ultimately made by the administrator.' 4 Unfortunately, the administrator
may have no training in the subject area of the dispute and have little or
no understanding of the substantive and procedural issues involved in a
particular case. The administrator may also be overburdened with cases.
Finally, the quality of a panel may suffer as the result of the unavailability
of experienced arbitrators. This is particularly true in complex cases which
demand considerable time and attention from an arbitrator. All of these
135. While potential arbitrators are asked to complete forms describing their academic and
work background and experience, the AAA has as a rule devoted little or no time to checking
those qualifications. See S. LAzARus, supra note 1, at 75-77.
136. See Keep Arbitration Simple, supra note 119, at 64.
137. See C. PETERSON, supra note 21, at 74 (observing that AAA data sheets are "insufficient
to determine the more subtle (and important) qualifications" of an arbitrator).
138. See Bayer & Abrahams, supra note 20, at 31; Coulson, supra note 67, at 676.
139. See Bayer & Abrahams, supra note 20, at 31 (observing that parties do not typically
have the time or resources to do a thorough job of checking out prospective arbitrators).
140. See CommERcIAL RuLEs, supra note 24, § 4.
141. Id.
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factors reduce the possibility that the selection process will produce arbitra-
tors with the necessary or desirable qualifications. 42
b. Problems with the Unqualified Arbitrator
Arbitrators have potentially greater control over the procedure and out-
come of the dispute resolution process than either judges or juries.' 43 Ar-
bitrators may establish and enforce hearing schedules,' 44 determine the extent
of discovery, 45 frame issues, 146 establish priorities for admission of evi-
dence, 47 question witnesses,"4 perform their own investigations, 49 and tailor
remedies according to their own sense of justice.5 0 Where arbitrators lack
requisite knowledge and experience, the process and the product are likely
to be unsatisfactory.',
An arbitrator without appropriate technical knowledge will require edu-
cation in the commercial fundamentals just as a judge or jury would. 52
Inexperienced arbitrators may have difficulty in narrowing the issues and
clarifying matters in dispute, thus opening the way for the introduction of
irrelevant and extraneous evidence.1Y3
142. If arbitrating parties are dissatisfied with the results of the selection process, they may
be more likely to question the fairness of the final award. See Middleton, supra note 28, at
785.
143. In discussing commercial arbitration, Professor Mentschikoff observed that "the ad-
versary model presupposes that the system of selecting deciders produces men who are capable
of understanding the nature of the issues, data and arguments to be presented, and who have
... or can obtain from the parties the knowledge necessary to make a wise decision." Ments-
chikoff, supra note 2, at 847. See also S. LAZARUs, supra note 1, at 66 (reasoning that "it is
on the competence of the arbitrator that commercial arbitration must stand or fall"); Barrett,
supra note 60, at 23 (concluding that guidelines and procedures are less critical to the outcome
of arbitration than the personalities of the arbitrators); Carlston, supra note 36, at 651 (con-
cluding that the success of arbitration depends upon the expertise and skill of the arbitrator).
See also Lyons, supra note 20, at 108 (quoting AAA President Robert Coulson as saying,
"[]eople choose arbitration mainly to have something resolved in a private setting, by people
who are knowledgeable"); Phillips, supra note 20, at 40, 47.
144. See Coulson, supra note 67, at 678; Poppleton, supra note 51, at 7.
145. See Callahan, supra note 110, at 4-5.
146. Barrett, supra note 60, at 18-19; Mentschikoff, supra note 1, at 705-07.
147. C. PETERSON, supra note 21, at 115, 133-48; Blutrich & Cuomo, supra note 51, at 38.
148. S. LAZARus, supra note 1, at 73; Faure, supra note 1, at 210.
149. See, e.g., COMMERCAL Rurns, supra note 24, § 33.
150. See supra note 122.
151. See Coulson, supra note 67, at 674. Keep Arbitration Simple, supra note 119, at 64.
152. See I.N. DuNcAN WALLACE, supra note 20, at 396 (questioning the true expertise of
panelists in construction arbitration in the United Kingdom); Bernstein, supra note 58, at 82
(noting that nonexperts may be misled regarding questions of business practice).
153. See supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text. In a much-quoted article dealing with
the problems of arbitrating large and complex disputes, Allen Poppleton admonishes arbitrators
to "manage the conduct of the proceedings with a firm hand;" among other things, he advocates
establishing and enforcing hearing schedules and limiting the evidence. Poppleton, supra note
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More importantly, the inability to come to grips with the fundamental
issues in a case may lead to a poor decision. It is often charged that an
arbitrator's ignorance or inexperience leads to unjustifiable compromise in
the award.1"4 This result is arguably facilitated by the absence of a written
rationale accompanying the decision 55 and by limitations on judicial re-
view. 156
3. Concerns Regarding Speed and Scheduling
Despite popular depictions of the process as a fast, efficient method of
dispute resolution,117 arbitrations are sometimes described as "monuments
51, at 7. For an arbitrator to take the active role he describes, experience is a prerequisite.
On the other hand, some question exists whether it is really advantageous to have "a
decisionmaker whose mind is filled with preconceptions regarding industry reputations and
procedures." Bayer & Abrahams, supra note 20, at 30. As previously noted, however, the
AAA attempts to address the potential problem of experiential and professional bias by requiring
multidisciplinary panels in larger cases. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text. In the
author's experience as advocate and arbitrator in construction cases, moreover, professional
labels are not an effective indicator of an individual's probable stance on issues in dispute.
See also Phillips, supra note 20, at 49. Knowledgeable, fair-minded arbitrators may be found
in the ranks of all construction-related professions.
154. The problem of arbitrator "compromise" is the subject of an ongoing debate among
students of arbitration. Some critics of arbitration view compromise awards as the unfortunate
result of the inability or unwillingness of arbitrators to come to grips with difficult factual or
legal questions, or to render an award wholly for one side or the other. See I.N. DUNCAN
WALLACE, supra note 20, at 395; Middleton, supra note 28, at 786. Other writers, like the
eminent Scottish philosopher David Hume, have described compromise as a natural and desirable
feature of processes which ameliorate the harsh "al! or nothing" justice of the courtroom:
Hence it is that in references, where the consent of the parties leave the referees
entire masters of the subject, they commonly discover so much equity and justice
on both sides as induces them to strike a medium, and divide the difference
betwixt the parties. Civil judges, who have not this liberty, but are obliged to
give a decisive sentence on some one side, are often at a loss how to determine,
and are necessitated to proceed on the most frivolous reasons in the world. Half
rights and obligations, which seem so natural in common life, are perfect ab-
surdities in their tribunal; for which reason they are often obliged to take half
arguments for whole ones, in order to terminate the affair one way or the other.
Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Vol. II, Book III, Part II, Section IV, in THE GRAT
LEGAL PImosoPHEis: SELECTED READINGS IN JURISPRUDENCE 211 (C. Morris ed. 1959). See
also Angel, supra note 116, at 593 (recommending that procedures for compromise are vital
for arbitration of disputes in continuing commercial relationships); Solove, supra note 21, at
137 (noting that arbitral compromises "preserve face" for each party); Comment, Predictability
of Result in Commercial Arbitration, 61 HA~v. L. REv. 1022, 1026 (1948) (reasoning that
clear-cut legal alternatives do not make sense in all cases). Others suggest that, regardless of
legal proprieties, judges and juries in fact regularly engage in compromise. See Lurie, supra
note 4, at 8.
The point has also been made that in complex cases involving numerous disputes, what
appears to be a compromise award may really be a division of claims. See Mentschikoff, supra
note 2, at 861. See also Foster, supra note 67, at 348.49. The AAA has concluded from in-
house surveys that commercial arbitrators "were willing to reach clear cut decisions." See infra
notes 297-98 and accompanying text. See also Coulson, supra note 13, at 1042.
155. See supra note 86.
156. See supra note 85.
157. See supra notes 74-88 and accompanying text.
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to delay." 1S1 As in litigation, there are numerous opportunities for a reluctant
party to frustrate the goals of speed and economy.5 9 As previously discussed,
a party wishing to avoid arbitration of a dispute may successfully delay
commencement of the process by resorting to the courts.6° Even if the
arbitration agreement is ultimately enforced, dispute resolution will have
been postponed for months or years.
After the arbitration process has begun, administrative delays may be
experienced. Although the AAA Rules are designed to establish outside limits
on the time it takes to attend to preliminary matters,' 6' an overburdened or
incapable administrator may fail to maintain such schedules. Difficulties in
finding suitable arbitrators and scheduling hearings may also impede the
process.
Delays may occur at the hearing stage as a result of uncertainties regarding
areas of dispute'6 2 and arbitrator reluctance to limit the evidence 63 or to set
and enforce schedules. 64 In the absence of discovery, attorneys may feel
compelled to turn cross examination into a "fishing expedition"-in effect,
a deposition with the arbitrators looking on. This "fishing" substantially
lengthens hearing time. 6 Alternatively, counsel may seek and receive per-
158. Standard Chlorine of Del., Inc. v. Leonard, 384 F.2d 304, 305 (2d Cir. 1967).
159. See generally Lyons, supra note 20 (discussing means available to parties who wish to
slow the arbitration process). The AAA has dropped its motto, "Speed, economy, justice."
In a recent interview, AAA President Robert Coulson stated, "We don't sell arbitration by
and large on the basis of speed and economy." Id. at 107. Rosemary Page, Associate General
Counsel of the AAA, has described arbitration as "slow but sure." Construction Experts Assess
Arbitration's Changing Tenor, supra note 61, at 16. See also Solove, supra note 21, at 137-
38 ("The cynical might suggest that ... arbitration is familiar enough to most lawyers to
provide them with an opportunity to reduce its effectiveness."); Arbitration Agony, supra note
4, at 59. Delays are the greatest problem in large or complex cases. See Lyons, supra note 20,
at 110.
160. See supra notes 96-104.
161. For example, the AAA Commercial Rules establish timetables for the filing of answers
to arbitration demands, for change of claim, and for return of arbitrator lists by the parties.
See COMmRCAL RuLEs, supra note 24, §§ 7(b), 8, 13.
162. See supra notes 112-13. One commentator recommends that in arbitration of complex
cases, the participants plan for a "familiarization period" of one or more days at the com-
mencement of hearings, during which the parties begin presentation of their cases and issues
are defined. See Barrett, supra note 60, at 19.
163. The perception that arbitrators "let it all in" is widespread. See Lyons, supra note 20,
at 109 (quoting one party as bemoaning the "excruciating fairness" of arbitration). See also
Bayer & Abrahams, supra note 20, at 32. It is consistent with the author's general experience.
Arbitrators may also take it upon themselves to question witnesses. An experienced panelist
may thus be able to reduce hearing time by focusing testimony on essential points. On the
other hand, lengthy arbitrator interrogation may extend hearing time without appreciable benefit
to anyone.
Although one would hope that it is not generally the case, compensated arbitrators who look
to arbitration as a source of supplementary income may not exert themselves to push hearings
along. See Phillips, supra note 20, at 39.
164. See Poppleton, supra note 51, at 7.
165. See C. PETERSON, supra note 21, at 108.
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mission to have the hearings continued pending an exchange of documents. M
If an arbitration continues beyond the original hearing schedule, it is often
difficult to find additional hearing dates when the parties and the members
of the arbitration panel are available. Because arbitrators are frequently
businesspersons or attorneys with busy schedules of their own, finding per-
iods of three or four days when all are free to attend hearings can pose a
serious problem in large or complex cases involving multi-member panels. 67
Moreover, a party desiring to delay the arbitration may take advantage of
ostensible scheduling conflicts to further impede the progress of hearings.
When hearings reconvene, there is inevitably time spent in reeducating the
panel regarding the facts of the case.
Further delays may be experienced after arbitration is concluded. Although
in arbitration the final award is meant to represent the end of dispute
resolution, it may be challenged in court. 168 While the chances of a successful
appeal are slim, 69 the judicial process may nevertheless result in a post-
ponement of the enforcement of an award.
D. Cost-Related Concerns
Some critics challenge the notion that arbitration is necessarily less ex-
pensive than litigation, particularly in cases which involve large amounts of
money or complex issues. 70 In addition to attorney's fees, parties may be
required to pay the fees of arbitrators, not to mention institutional admin-
istration fees and other arbitration-related expenses. It is argued that lawyer's
fees in arbitration may actually exceed fees for litigating a comparable case
because, although there is relatively little prehearing practice, actual hearing
time and related preparation time may be greater.17' Moreover, since many
practicing attorneys, including many with substantial litigation experience,
still know little or nothing about arbitration, the cost of educating counsel
may be a factor.
Under the AAA Rules, the party filing a demand for arbitration is required
to pay a filing fee. 172 The sum is figured as a percentage of the amount
claimed; 7 1 it may bear no relationship to the complexity of the case, the
166. Id.
167. See Fabyanske & Halverson, supra note 21, at 289; Horowitz, supra note 13, at 70.
168. See Bayer & Abrahams, supra note 20, at 31. See generally Lennard, supra note 96,
at 692 (discussing ways to stay out of court). See also supra notes 84-88 and accompanying
text.
169. See Lennard, supra note 96, at 692.
170. See Coulson, supra note 67, at 681; Foster, supra note 67, at 340; Hart, supra note
20, at 456; Horowitz, supra note 13, at 68-70; Phillips, supra note 20, at 39; Poor, supra note
87, at 677.
171. See Poor, supra note 87, at 677. See also supra notes 162-66 and accompanying text.
172. See COMMERCAL Ru s, supra note 24, § 48.
173. See id. § 48, at 17.
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number of days of hearing time required, or the administrative time actually
devoted to the case by the Association. On the other hand, the filing fee
may represent a great financial burden to certain claimants who are owed
substantial sums of money by the other party. It should also be noted that
the AAA fee does not cover the arbitrator's fees and expenses' 74 (which may
amount to a considerable sum in a long arbitration) or the cost of a hearing
room. Parties desiring a record of the proceedings must also absorb the cost
of transcripts. 7 - Moreover, there are limits on the shifting of costs and fees
in arbitration. The Uniform Arbitration Act allows arbitrators to grant
awards of related costs, but does not permit the shifting of attorney's fees
in the absence of a contractual provision authorizing such awards.'
76
The foregoing discussion reveals a wide divergence of opinion regarding
American arbitration. While arbitration continues to hold out the promise
of "a better way to do it," evidence indicates that for many that promise
has not been fulfilled. On the other hand, efforts to evaluate and to improve
the process have traditionally been frustrated by the scarcity of empirical
information from user groups. Recently, however, our understanding and
appreciation of commercial arbitration was dramatically furthered by a major
American Bar Association survey.
II. THE ANmRICAN BAR AssoCIATION ARBITRATION SURVEY
In 1985 and 1986, the Forum Committee on the Construction Industry
and the Construction Litigation Division of the ABA Litigation Section
sponsored a survey of attitudes toward commercial arbitration.'7 The first
such major independent undertaking since the early 1960's, the survey was
directed to practicing attorneys in an effort to gather detailed information
on their experience with arbitration of construction cases. The primary
emphasis was on the Construction Industry Arbitration Rules of the Amer-
ican Arbitration Association.18 The questionnaire, which was distributed to
over 3,000 members of the construction bar, also sought feedback on re-
commendations for improving the arbitration process.' 79
The responses provide valuable insights into the perceived strengths and
weaknesses of commercial arbitration.'80 The experience of the construction
174. See id. § 51. See also Coulson, supra note 67, at 681.
175. See ComMERCIAL RuLas, supra note 24, § 23.
176. See supra note 124.
177. See infra notes 183-248 and accompanying text.
178. See infra Section IIA.
179. See infra notes 210-40, 244-48 and accompanying text.
180. Given the extraordinary length of the survey questionnaire and the large number of
responses, the only feasible way to derive full benefit from the survey data was to subject the
results to computer-aided statistical analysis. The author undertook this analysis after being
furnished with all of the completed questionnaires, including 454 from members of the ABA
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bar encompasses arbitration of a wide variety of cases, simple and complex,
two-party and multiparty, from the viewpoint of advocate and arbitrator.
Given the similarity between the Construction Industry Arbitration Rules
and the more generally applied AAA Commercial Rules,'' the constructive
criticisms offered by survey respondents may be effectively applied to ar-
bitration of other types of commercial disputes. When viewed in combination
with earlier studies and recent data compiled by the AAA, the ABA survey
results furnish a basis for recommending possible reforms to the arbitration
process.8 2
Of the 513 ABA members responding to the survey, 90% had participated
in or were currently participating in a construction arbitration sponsored by
the American Arbitration Association. Approximately 93% of all respondents
indicated some form of construction arbitration experience either as advocate
or arbitrator. Of the remaining 7%, a majority indicated a familarity with
arbitration, perhaps through arbitration of other kinds of commercial cases.
The surveyed attorneys were asked to describe their experience with arbi-
tration and to compare various aspects of arbitration with litigation of similar
cases before a judge or jury. The answers reveal much about the effectiveness
of arbitration in achieving its goals.
A. Respondent Perceptions of Arbitrator Selection, Qualifications
and Decisionmaking
A number of questions sought information regarding perceptions of ar-
bitrators and arbitral awards. Although the responses were generally positive,
the data revealed a diversity of opinion regarding arbitrators and their
decisions.
The group was asked to describe the "qualifications" of arbitrators based
upon their overall experience in (1) cases involving in excess of $250,000
and (2) cases involving less than $250,000.181 In both classes of cases most
Forum Committee and 59 from the ABA Construction Litigation Division. The author prepared
a preliminary analysis of the survey responses for the annual meeting of the ABA Forum
Committee in San Francisco, California, May 1, 1987. See Stipanowich, A Preliminary Analysis
of Responses to the Questionnaire on Construction Industry Arbitration, 7 CONSTRUCTION LAW.
17 (Aug. 1987).
181. See CONSTRUCTION RULES, supra note 24. Compare COMMERCIAL RULES, supra note 24.
182. See infra notes 300-41 and accompanying text.
183. The authors of the survey selected $250,000 as an arbitrary dividing line in the interest
of developing comparative data relating to amount in controversy. The survey results revealed
that respondents were generally less satisfied with arbitration in cases involving larger amounts
of money.
A number of responding attorneys indicated that they would have preferred to differentiate
between cases involving claims of less than $50,000 and cases involving amounts greater than
$50,000. Historically, the AAA has appointed one arbitrator in the former class of cases, and
empaneled three arbitrators in the latter class.
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attorneys rated arbitrator qualifications as "good" or "excellent," although
more than a third of those responding characterized arbitrator qualifications
as no better than "fair. '1 8 4 When respondents were questioned regarding
the quality of arbitrators on AAA panels, similar results were obtained.
1 85
When asked to rate the adequacy of training of AAA arbitrators, the
survey group was more critical: the average rating was only slightly better
than "fair." 8 ' Although the questionnaire did not clarify whether "training"
184. The results were as follows:
Cases Involving More Cases Involving Less
Than $250,000 Than $250,000
Rating of Number of Number of
Qualifications Responses Percent Responses Percent
Excellent 63 15.4 59 15.4
Good 191 46.8 189 49.2
Fair 121 29.7 109 28.4
Poor 29 7.1 24 6.3
Very Poor 4 1.0 3 0.8
Assigning numerical values to each of the responses on a five-point scale, with 1 being
"excellent," 2 being "good," 3 being "fair," 4 being "poor," and 5 being "very poor," the
group average for cases involving more than $250,000 was 2.32; the average was 2.28 for cases
involving less than $250,000. If one were to describe the ratings in terms of letter grades ("A"
representing "excellent," "B" representing "good," "C" representing "fair," "D" representing
"poor" and "F" representing "very poor"), the average rating for arbitrator qualifications
would be a "B- ."
185. The question related to respondent experiences with various AAA regional offices,
permitting multiple responses by each attorney in the survey. The question did not differentiate
between cases involving larger and smaller sums. The results were as follows:
Numerical Number of
Rating Equivalent Responses Percent
A-Excellent 1.0 132 18.4
B-Good 2.0 365 51.0
C-Fair 3.0 168 23.5
D-Poor 4.0 35 4.9
E-Very Poor 5.0 16 2.2
Total responses: 716
Group average [on five point scale]: 2.22
Letter grade equivalent: B-
186. Group results for all AAA regional offices regarding adequacy of arbitrator training
were as follows:
Numerical Number of
Rating Equivalent Responses Percent
A-Excellent 1.0 55 8.1
B-Good 2.0 254 37.5
C-Fair 3.0 260 38.3
D-Poor 4.0 81 11.9
E-Very Poor 5.0 28 4.1
Total responses: 678
Group average [on five point scale]: 2.665
Letter grade equivalent: C+
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was intended to refer to formal training by the AAA or to pertinent general
education or experience, arbitrator training was closely linked to arbitrator
quality in the minds of the respondents. 87
Respondents gave even lower marks to the AAA in judging the quality
of information supplied with respect to potential arbitrators. 8" When asked
whether the method by which the AAA describes the background and qual-
ifications of potential panelists was satisfactory, a bare majority responded
affirmatively. 8 9 More than 200 respondents registered specific complaints
187. The perceived relationship between arbitrator quality and training is made clear by a
comparison of survey data for various specific regional offices of the AAA for which twenty
or more responses were received. The rankings indicate relative ratings on a five-point scale
(with 1.0 representing "excellent" and 5.0 representing "very poor"):
Arbitrator Quality Arbitrator Training
AAA AAA
Regional Number of Regional Number of
Office Responses Rating Office Responses Rating
Denver 26 2.00 Seattle 26 2.31
Seattle 28 2.04 Los Angeles 24 2.38
Philadelphia 31 2.10 Denver 25 2.44
San Francisco 38 2.11 Philadelphia 28 2.50
D.C. 41 2.15 San Francisco 35 2.51
Los Angeles 30 2.17 Atlanta 44 2.52
Atlanta 47 2.17 D.C. 40 2.62
Chicago 42 2.21 Chicago 40 2.63
New York 42 2.24 New York 42 2.67
Dallas 41 2.24 Charlotte 46 2.67
Charlotte 47 2.30 Minneapolis 27 2.74
Minneapolis 28 2.32 New Jersey 20 2.80
Miami 49 2.32 Dallas 39 2.85
Boston 24 2.42 Boston 25 2.92
New Jersey 20 2.45 Miami 47 3.04
Detroit 23 2.57 Detroit 22 3.09
188. Group results for all AAA regional offices regarding quality of information supplied
regarding potential arbitrators were as follows:
Numerical Number of
Rating Equivalent Responses Percent
A-Excellent 1.0 38 5.3
B-Good 2.0 198 27.7
C-Fair 3.0 325 45.4
D-Poor 4.0 125 17.5
E-Very Poor 5.0 29 4.1
Total responses: 715
Group average [on five point scale]: 2.87
Letter grade equivalent: C +
189. Approximately 52016 of those responding to the question found the AAA biographical
information satisfactory, while 47% did not. The remainder were uncertain.
Each member of the survey group was also asked whether the cases in which he or she was
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regarding the system. 90
Respondent attitudes toward arbitral decisionmaking and awards also re-
flected a diversity of opinion. The group's assessment of the fairness of
arbitrator decisions mirrored perceptions of arbitrator quality: while most
described their experience as "good" or "excellent," more than a third of
the group described arbitrator decisions as "fair" or worse.' 9' Group per-
ceptions regarding the "predictability" of arbitration were less positive. 92
involved "generally have party appointed arbitrators." The intent of the question was apparently
to determine how frequently parties followed the practice of directly selecting one or more of
the arbitrators instead of using the standard AAA appointment procedure. Although a majority
of those who responded to the question indicated that they did not generally use party appointed
arbitrators, almost 40% did use party-appointed arbitrators. This is curious in light of the fact
that the AAA generally discourages parties from using party-appointed arbitrators, although
the rules do provide for such a procedure. The responses may have resulted from a misinter-
pretation of the question; a number of respondents specifically indicated that they assumed
"party appointed" included appointments through the normal AAA selection procedure, under
which lists of arbitrators are forwarded to the parties. See supra notes 133-34 and accompanying
text.
190. Criticisms generally focused upon the lack of detail in the biographies. Eighty-seven
commenting attorneys wished to have more information on candidates' prior occupations and
work experience, while 22 wanted more data on client affiliations or "plaintiff or defendant
orientation." Seventy-one respondents called for more specific information on each candidate's
experience in arbitration. Thirty-seven complained that the AAA had failed to keep the bio-
graphical files reasonably current, while 24 believed that the AAA failed to do investigation
of potential panelists or set high enough standards for arbitrators.
191. Group results were as follows:
Cases Involving More
Than $250,000
Number of
Responses Percent
56 14.2
187 47.5
118 29.9
27 6.9
Cases Involving Less
Than $250,000
Number of
Responses Percent
50 13.2
195 51.6
104 27.5
24 6.3
5 1.3
The average rating by the survey group was 2.34, the equivalent of a "B-," for cases
involving amounts greater than $250,000. The rating was approximately the same (2.31) for
cases involving less than $250,000.
192. Group results were as follows:
Cases Involving More
Than $250,000
Number of
Responses Percent
17 4.3
174 44.4
131 33.4
47 12.0
23 5.9
Cases Involving Less
Than $250,000
Number of
Responses Percent
23 6.3
172 46.7
116 31.5
39 10.6
18 4.9
Rating of
Fairness
A-Excellent
B-Good
C-Fair
D-Poor
F-Very poor
Rating of
Predictability
A-Excellent
B-Good
C-Fair
D-Poor
F-Very poor
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Moreover, a significant minority of respondents indicated that in their ex-
perience, arbitrators rendered unjustifiable compromise decisions. 193
On the other hand, arbitrators compared favorably with juries and judges
in perceived decisionmaking capability. Almost 40% of those responding
rated arbitrators as generally fairer than juries, and another 43% believed
they were equally as fair. Twenty-four percent ranked arbitration below
bench trial in terms of fairness, but an equal number ranked it higher. The
remaining half of the group rated the two equally fair.
Perhaps not surprisingly, respondent perceptions regarding arbitrators ap-
parently affected views on other aspects of arbitration. An analysis of the
survey results indicated that the less favorable a person's view of the quality
of decisionmakers in arbitration, the more likely that person was to support
broader judicial review of arbitration awards 9 4 and to insist upon written
findings of fact or conclusions of law in support of awards. 95 Such res-
pondents were also less likely to support rules specifically permitting arbi-
The average "predictability" rating by the survey group was 2.70, the equivalent of a "C+ ,"
for cases involving amounts greater than $250,000. The rating was slightly more positive (2.61)
for cases involving less than $250,000.
Predictability of result in arbitration may be affected not only by perceptions of the deci-
sionmaker, but also by the relative absence of prehearing discovery and motion practice. There
may be no opportunity to hear or understand an opponent's case until the hearings.
193. Of the 476 attorneys who responded to the question, 41% indicated that they believed
arbitrators rendered unjustifiable compromise decisions. Approximately 52% of those respond-
ing disagreed, and almost 7% indicated uncertainty.
194. Responses were grouped according to perceptions of the quality of AAA arbitrators on
the previously described five-point scale (1.0 representing "excellent," 5.0 representing "very
poor"). Thus, in the chart below, Group 1 represents those respondents with the highest opinion
of arbitrator quality, and Group 4 those with the least favorable opinion.
Group Perception Percent
of Arbitrator Number of Favoring More
Group No. Quality Responses Judicial Control
I Less than 2.0 83 13.3
2 Greater than or equal
to 2.0, less than 3.0 230 24.3
3 Greater than or equal
to 3.0, less than 4.0 140 37.1
4 Greater than or equal
to 4.0, less than 5.0 19 52.6
195. For each of the four groups described supra note 194, the results were as follows:
Percent Favoring Percent Favoring
Group No. Findings of Fact Conclusions of Law
1 33.8 23.6
2 49.3 32.4
3 67.5 50.8
4 86.7 86.7
1988] AMERICAN ARBITRATION 459
trators to award punitive damages196 or attorney's fees. 97 They tended to be
more critical of the AAA biographical data on potential arbitrators 9 ' and
the AAA fee structure,'9 and less sanguine about the speed, cost, fairness
and predictability of arbitration. 2°0 Moreover, their clients were less likely
to repeat the experience. 2
0
'
196. For each of the four groups described supra note 194, the results were as follows:
Percent Favoring Rule
Group No. Permitting Punitive Damages
1 40.2
2 31.2
3 22.7
4 26.3
197. For each of the four groups described supra note 194, the results were as follows:
Percent Favoring Rule
Group No. Permitting Attorney's Fees
1 72.3
2 70.0
3 64.0
4 63.2
198. For each of the four groups described supra note 194, the results were as follows:
Percent Finding AAA
Group No. Biographies Satisfactory
1 77.2
2 54.7
3 37.9
4 16.7
199. For each of the four groups described supra note 194, the results were as follows:
Percent Concerned About
Group No. AAA Fee Structure
1 28.9
2 41.6
3 47.9
4 55.6
200. Exemplary of these trends are following results relating to perceptions of the fairness
of arbitration in cases involving more than $250,000. They reflect numerical ratings on a five-
point scale (1.0 representing "excellent," 5.0 representing "very poor") for each of the groups
described supra note 194:
Rating of Fairness of
Group No. Arbitration by Group
1 1.54
2 2.22
3 2.91
4 3.60
201. For each of the four groups described supra note 194, the results were as follows:
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B. Perceptions Regarding the Speed and Scheduling of Arbitration
The survey attempted to gauge lawyer attitudes regarding the much-vaunted
speed and efficiency of arbitration. On average, the respondents indicated,
arbitration was a speedier means of dispute resolution than either jury trial
or bench trial. 2 2 The results were clearly more favorable in cases involving
Percent Indicating Clients
Would Arbitrate Again
Cases Involving More Cases Involving Less
Group No. Than $250,000 Than $250,000
1 71.2 75.0
2 55.0 69.1
3 24.7 50.5
4 7.7 7.7
202. The group was asked to compare the average duration of various phases of arbitration
and jury trial and bench trial. Unfortunately, no distinction was made in the questionnaire
between cases involving various amounts of money. The results for the overall group were as
follows:
Comparison With Jury Trial
Prehearing time in Number of
arbitration is: Responses Percent
Faster than jury trial 393 86.8
Same as in jury trial 45 - 9.9
Slower than in jury trial 15 3.3
Speed of hearings in Number of
arbitration is: Responses Percent
Faster than jury trial 280 61.8
Same as in jury trial 71 15.7
Slower than in jury trial 102 22.5
Speed of dispute resolution in Number of
arbitration is: Responses Percent
Faster than jury trial 338 75.4
Same as in jury trial 66 14.7
Slower than in jury trial 44 9.8
Comparison With Bench Trial
Prehearing time in Number of
arbitration is: Responses Percent
Faster than bench trial 345 75.7
Same as in bench trial 84 18.4
Slower than in bench trial 27 5.9
Speed of hearings in Number of
arbitration is: Responses Percent
Faster than bench trial 193 42.6
Same as in bench trial 142 31.3
Slower than in bench trial 118 26.0
Speed of dispute resolution in Number of
arbitration is: Responses Percent
Faster than bench trial 297 66.1
Same as in bench trial 100 22.3
Slower than in bench trial 52 11.6
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smaller amounts of money, particularly during the hearing stage. 20 3 Survey
comments indicated that in bigger cases, hearings were drawn out because
of the difficulty of scheduling sessions at mutually convenient times.
Respondents identified attorneys as the primary cause of delays in arbi-
tration of both small and large cases. 2°4 Whatever the bases of this perception,
respondents were clearly concerned about delays in arbitration. They sup-
ported various methods of minimizing delays and disruptions, including
giving arbitrators the power to impose attorney's fees or other sanctions in
appropriate cases.205
C. Perceptions Regarding the Costs of Arbitration
When asked to rate arbitration as an "economical means of dispute
resolution," responding attorneys gave it the equivalent of a "C+" for
cases involving more than $250,000 and a "B-" for cases involving less
than that amount.206 On average, the survey group rated arbitration as
somewhat less costly than litigation;207 a number of attorneys, however,
203. The following figures summarize group results on a five-point scale, with 1.0 representing
"excellent," and 5.0 representing "very poor":
Cases Involving More Cases Involving Less
Than $250,000 Than $250,000
Time to first hearing 2.37 2.06
Speed of hearings 2.73 2.01
Speed of decision 2.20 1.98
204. When asked to identify any causes of "abnormal delay" in the arbitration proceedings,
about 60% of the total survey group responded. The following is a tabulation of the identified
causes of delay in order of frequency:
Cases Involving More Cases Involving Less
Than $250,000 Than $250,000
Attorneys (78%) Attorneys (70%)
Arbitrators (43%) Parties (40%)
Litigation (430o) Arbitrators (29%)
Parties (43%) - Administrative problems (24%)
Type of dispute (31%) Litigation (23%)
Administrative problems (25%) Type of dispute (14%7)
205. See infra notes 231-34 and accompanying text.
206. Average group ratings on the five-point numerical scale (1.0 representing "excellent,"
5.0 representing "very poor") were 2.68 for cases involving amounts over $250,000 and 2.23
for amounts under that figure.
207. The survey group was asked to compare the economies of arbitration to jury trial and
bench trial:
How Does Arbitration Compare to Jury Trial
as an Economical Means of Dispute Resolution?
Number of
Responses Percent
Better than jury trial 251 56.2
Same as jury trial 134 30.0
Worse than jury trial 62 13.9
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indicated that if the questionnaire had permitted it they would have reflected
different results depending on the size of the case.
Over 40% of those responding indicated that the fee structure of the AAA
influenced their recommendations to clients regarding arbitration. Of',the
165 attorneys who offered specific comments, all but two indicated that the
fees were a negative factor in considering the arbitration alternative. 208
D. Client Perceptions
According to the respondents, their clients' views of arbitration mirrored
their own. Like their attorneys, clients were apparently more satisfied with
the speed, cost, quality of decisionmaking, and fairness of arbitration in
smaller cases. 2°9 In disputes involving less than $250,000, approximately 62%
of responding attorneys indicated that their clients would again choose ar-
bitration; where the amount in controversy was greater, however, only 46%
of responding attorneys believed their clients would arbitrate again.
E. AAA Administration
Though rarely mentioned in the literature of commercial arbitration, the
AAA case administrator is a critical cog in the arbitration mechanism. When
asked to describe the quality of case administration provided by the AAA
on the basis of past experience, the results were similarto assessments of
arbitrator quality. While almost 70% of those responding described the
performance of tribunal administrators as "good" or "excellent," 12%
labelled their experience "poor" or worse. However, results varied consid-
erably among the various AAA regional offices.
How Does Arbitration Compare to Bench Trial
as an Economical Means of Dispute Resolution?
Number
Responses Percent
Better than bench trial 233 53.1
Same as bench trial 132 30.1
Worse than bench trial 74 16.9
208. The most frequently made comment was to the effect that the fees were high or excessive,
especially in larger cases. Many attorneys complained that the AAA fee structure was unfair,
and bore no relation to the administrative burden on the Association; some advocated a fee
tied to the number of hearing days. A few unfavorably compared arbitration-related costs and
fees to the expense of litigation, while others said that the AAA fees discouraged the use of
arbitration (or at least the use of the AAA). Finally, some commented that the preliminary
filing fee presented a difficult obstacle for certain claimants and gave defendants an additional
strategic advantage.
209. For example, on average the respondents perceived that on a five-point numerical scale
(1.0 representing "excellent," and 5.0 representing "very poor"), their clients would assess
speed of dispute resolution at 2.47 for arbitrations involving more than $250,000 and at 2.18
for arbitrations involving less than $250,000.
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F. Arbitration Procedures: Form and Reform
In addition to being polled regarding their experience in arbitration, mem-
bers of the survey group were asked many specific questions about arbitration
procedures currently employed by the AAA. Their answers, which include
many detailed comments, provide valuable insights into the workability of
the AAA Rules and suggest possible procedural reforms.
1. Pre-hearing Conferences and Preliminary Hearings
Respondents were asked whether they had "participated in a pre-hearing
conference before an AAA representative." Almost half of those surveyed
answered affirmatively. 210 Over four-fifths of that number found such con-
ferences helpful. Written comments by a small number of attorneys under-
lined the usefulness of such hearings in arranging discovery or document
exchange, in scheduling, in defining disputed issues, and in selecting arbi-
trators. On the other hand, a few attorneys observed that such conferences
were more valuable if conducted by one or more arbitrators rather than an
AAA representative. There was also some concern that tribunal administra-
tors and other AAA representatives might not have or exercise the authority
to compel the parties to cooperate in discovery.
Although fewer respondents had participated in preliminary hearings be-
fore members of the arbitration panel, 21' nearly nine-tenths of that group
indicated that the meetings with the arbitrators were helpful. The relative
few who commented observed that the procedure proved valuable in ar-
ranging for discovery, in narrowing pertinent factual and legal issues, or in
familiarizing the parties with the panel and the procedures to be followed
in the hearings. A small number of respondents suggested that such hearings
be limited to large or complex cases while a few others observed that the
ultimate effectiveness of such hearings depended on the quality and force-
fulness of the arbitrator or panel.
2. Counterclaims, Joinder and Consolidation
Participants responded favorably to the notion that the AAA Construction
Industry Arbitration Rules should provide for a "mandatory counterclaim."
210. Two hundred thirty-nine attorneys, approximately 47% of the entire group, acknowl-
edged participation in such conferences. The question was intended to refer to pre-hearing
conferences conducted by the case administrator or other AAA employee. See CONSTRUCTION
RULES, supra note 24, § 10. Compare COMERCuL RULES, supra note 24, § 10. However,
comments by a few attorneys indicate that at least some of the respondents may have thought
the question referred to what the AAA refers to as a "preliminary hearing," a meeting chaired
by the arbitrator(s). See infra note 211.
211. Two hundred one attorneys, approximately 39% of the entire survey group, acknowl-
knowledged participation in a preliminary hearing. See CONSTRUCTION RULES, supra note 24,
§ 10. Compare COMMERCIAL RULES, supra note 24, § 10.
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Sixty-one percent of those surveyed approved of such a provision, at least
where the counterclaim was directly related to the same subject matter as
the original claim. The comments underlined the importance which respon-
dents place upon resolving all related claims in a single hearing. The AAA
Rules currently permit parties to file counterclaims, 21 2 but do not mandate
such filing.
When asked whether arbitrators should be given the specific power to join
parties to arbitration or to consolidate disputes, more than two-thirds of
those responding said "yes," regardless of the amount in controversy.213 On
the other hand, nearly all of those offering written comments observed that
such power may be wielded by arbitrators only if the affected parties have
consented to arbitration. In this regard, a few attorneys noted, the arbitration
provisions in standard industry contract documents represent a partial ob-
stacle. For example, the American Institute of Architects' standard forms
prohibit the inclusion, "by consolidation or joinder or in any manner," of
architects or their employees or consultants in arbitrations involving owners
and contractors, except by the specific written consent of all parties. 21 4 It
was also observed that successful implementation of arbitrator-ordered third
party practice might require amendments to state and federal arbitration
statutes.
21 5
3. Discovery
Although the AAA Rules and the AAA Construction Rules provide gen-
erally for the issuance of subpoenas by the panel of arbitrators, 2 6 they do
not set forth any guidelines for discovery in arbitration. Such matters have
been handled on a case-by-case basis according to the wishes of the parties
and the disposition of the arbitrator. 217
The survey indicated that 85°o of those responding believed that arbitrators
should be given the power to require production of all relevant documents
212. COMMERcIAL RULEs, supra note 24, §§ 7, 8.
213. Two hundred ninety-six attorneys, almost 69% of those responding to the question,
favored giving the arbitrators such power in cases involving amounts in excess of $250,000.
Two hundred fifty-six attorneys, approximately 65% of those responding to the question,
favored such a rule in cases involving less than $250,000.
214. See, e.g., THm AMiRicAN INsTITUTE OF ARCHiTECTS, AIA DOCUMENT A201, GENE.AL
CONDITIONS OF THE CONTRACT FOR CONSTRUCTION § 7.9.1 (1976 ed.); TE AMERICAN INSTITUTE
oF ARCITECTS, AIA DOCUMENT A201, GENERAL CONDITONS OF THE CONTRACT FOR CONSTRUC-
TION § 4.5.5 (1987 ed.).
215. For a discussion of the role of statutes in arbitration of multiparty disputes, see
Stipanowich, supra note 105.
216. See CONSTRUCTION RULES, supra note 24, § 31. See also COMMERCIAL RULES, supra note
24, § 31.
217. See supra notes 48, 110 and accompanying text.
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prior to arbitration proceedings in cases involving amounts over $250,000.211
For the same class of cases, more than 90% supported a rule giving arbi-
trators the power to require production of documents which would be in-
troduced at the hearing. 2 9 According to the written comments, many
respondents were in favor of giving arbitrators even broader discovery power;
the majority, however, preferred to keep arbitration-related discovery more
limited in scope than discovery in civil litigation. 0
Expanded power to order discovery was also a significant concern in cases
involving sums less than $250,000. Here, too, there was a clear mandate for
implementation of more specific rules on arbitrator-ordered discovery, at
least to the extent of document production. " '1
4. Statement of Claim
Participants strongly supported the requirement of a statement of claim.
More than three-quarters of those responding to the question favored a rule
requiring parties to file a detailed "pretrial" statement or statement of claim
prior to the arbitration hearings in cases involving more than $250,000.2
There was, however, substantial difference of opinion as to the degree of
detail which should be required of such documents.?2 In cases involving less
218. Three hundred seventy-four of 440 responding attorneys, or 85.0%, favored such a
rule.
219. Three hundred ninety-three of 434 responding attorneys, or 90.6%, favored such a rule.
220. While 70 commenting attorneys called for discovery rules modeled on judicial rules,
more respondents indicated a preference for more limited discovery. While a number of attorneys
failed to define what sort of limits they considered appropriate, more than 60 recommended
specific restrictions on numbers of interrogatories or depositions. Another 23 favored the
establishment of enforceable time constraints. Nineteen wished to limit arbitral discovery to
document production. Finally, more than 40 attorneys preferred to leave the scope and timing
of discovery to the discretion of the arbitrator.
221. Three hundred eight attorneys, almost 77% of those responding to the question, favored
a rule authorizing arbitrators to require production of all relevant documents prior to hearings
in cases involving less than $250,000. Three hundred forty-five attorneys, nearly 87% of those
responding, supported a rule giving arbitrators the power to require production of exhibits
prior to hearings. Written comments were similar to those for cases involving greater sums.
222. Three hundred forty-one of 441 respondents, or 77.3%, favored a rule requiring a
pretrial statement.
223. According to written comments by 99 respondents, pretrial statements should identify
specific claims or defenses and pertinent factual or legal issues. Twenty-eight attorneys believed
such statements should include calculations supporting claims for damages and various other
kinds of supporting data, 25 called for inclusion of lists of witnesses, and another 18 for lists
of exhibits.
While 23 respondents believed the statement of claim should be detailed, and include all
supporting evidence, an equal number concluded that the statement should be summary or
outline in form. Forty-six attorneys desired filings similar to those required by rules of court,
but 16 thought the requirements should be flexible enough to accommodate cases of differing
size and complexity. Eighteen attorneys preferred to leave the matter to arbitrator discretion.
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than $250,000, over 70% of those responding desired some form of pretrial
statement.
22A
5. Time Limits and Scheduling
Concerns with the speed and efficiency of arbitration prompted many
attorneys to recommend limits on the amount or duration of discovery.
Substantial support was also evidenced for other controls on hearing time
and scheduling. When asked whether specific time schedules or rules should
be imposed "so as to further promote prompt resolutions of disputes," 57%
of those who responded answered affirmatively. The comments clearly
indicated that a number of attorneys believed that the AAA Construction
Rules should be amended to set arbitrary time limits in some way.32 6 However,
more attorneys appeared to favor a flexible rule calling for the setting of
schedules by agreement of the parties or by arbitrator order; many recom-
mended that this be done at a preliminary hearing.227
The group was less supportive of a rule making arbitration proceedings
continuous "even if an arbitrary time limitation on each party is required
to complete the proceeding within the available scheduled time." More than
40% of the respondents thought such a rule was advisable in light of the
prejudicial effect of breaks in hearings and the potential for employing
stalling tactics.2 2 Most attorneys, however, seemed to share the concerns of
the forty-seven who commented that continuous hearings, while desirable,
might not be practical or possible considering the schedules of arbitrators
and witnesses, the need to provide both parties a fair opportunity to prepare
and present their cases, and the need for flexibility in the handling of claims
224. Two hundred eighty-seven of 403 respondents, or 71.2%, favored a rule requiring a
pretrial statement in cases involving less than $250,000. Only 48 respondents offered written
comments regarding statements for this class of cases. Of the 48, 14 supported the inclusion
of lists of witnesses and 11 others recommended inclusion of exhibit lists. Nine others wanted
to include data supporting claims, including calculations as to damages.
225. Two hundred eighty-four of 496 respondents, or 57.3%, were in favor of such measures.
226. Of 177 respondents who offered written comments, 52 called for some form of amend-
ment to the AAA Rules. Although some were not specific as to the form of the amendment,
others wanted a rule setting forth a specific number of days or months within which arbitration
would begin or end, or requiring a specific number of hours or days of arbitration within a
specific time period.
227. Ninety-four of the 177 respondents offered comments to the effect that arbitration
schedules should be set on a case-by-case basis. Some preferred leaving the matter to the
arbitrators, while others would first permit the parties to set their own schedules. A number
of respondents said that schedules should be set at a preliminary conference.
228. Two hundred seven of 473 respondents, or 43.8%, favored such a rule. Of 125 com-
menting attorneys, 17 supported the rule on the basis that breaks in the hearings were prejudicial
to the parties and permitted stalling. Eleven preferred to make continuous hearings a requirement
only in smaller, less complex cases, while eleven said there should be continuous hearings but
no time limit. Fifteen said that continuous hearings should be a goal but not a requirement in
arbitration. Ten others said that arbitrators should be given flexibility in applying the rule.
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(particularly where new disputes arise during the course of the arbitration).
Attorney concern with the speed and efficiency of arbitration was also
reflected in the group's strong support for imposing attorney's fees and other
sanctions. 9
6. Remedies in Arbitration
Approximately two-thirds of the survey group were opposed to amending
the Rules to expressly authorize arbitrators to award punitive damages. 2 0
The comments indicated that some respondents had a general aversion to
punitive damages; other respondents believed such relief should be the ex-
clusive domain of the courts. A few observed that some arbitrators might
be incompetent to frame such awards; others saw a danger of arbitrarindss
in their decisions. On the other hand, some attorneys believed that arbitrators
could award punitive damages if allowed by applicable law.
Interestingly, the survey reflected a very different attitude toward a rule
giving arbitrators the power to award attorney's fees. Two-thirds of the
group favored such a rule,23' although there was considerable disagreement
as to precisely how it should be structured. 23 2
The attorneys also strongly favored giving arbitrators the express authority
to impose sanctions when a party fails to comply with the arbitration rules. 233
Although the few comments offered suggest that there was a range of opinion
as to the nature of permissible sanctions, 234 the group response revealed a
strong desire on the part of the construction bar to have arbitrators exert
greater control over arbitration and to require parties to cooperate in the
efficient and expeditious presentation of the case.
229. See infra notes 231, 233-34 and accompanying text.
230. Three hundred fifty-one of the 502 attorneys who responded, almost 70%, indicated
their disapproval of a rule on punitive damages.
231. Three hundred forty-five of the 503 attorneys who responded, nearly 69%, favored
such a rule.
232. Of the 224 respondents who offered comments, 45 would permit awards of attorney's
fees in cases where parties invoked frivolous or bad faith claims or defenses; another 17 would
shift fees where a party unreasonably delayed the arbitration process. Thirty-six others called
for imposition of standards similar to those followed by courts of law. Forty-two respondents
would permit attorney's fees where provided for by the agreement of the parties. Thirty-eight
attorneys desired a rule awarding attorney's fees to the prevailing party, while 10 preferred
simply to leave such awards to the discretion of the arbitrator. Twenty-six commented that the
matter should be left to local statute or other law.
233. Three hundred seventy-seven of 439 responding attorneys, nearly 86%, supported sanc-
tions in some form in cases involving amounts over $250,000. Three hundred twenty-nine of
398 respondents, nearly 83%, favored sanctions in cases involving amounts less than $250,000.
Interestingly, 83% of those who disapproved of a rule permitting arbitrators to award punitive
damages favored a rule permitting arbitrators to impose sanctions for violations of the arbi-
tration rules.
234. A few attorneys suggested that the power to sanction should include the authority to
render a default judgment.
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7. Award and Review
The survey reflected considerable support for a provision in the arbitration
rules which would make the decision of the arbitrators "final, binding and
conclusive except in cases of fraud, arbitrariness, and capriciousness of the
arbitrators." 235 As many commenting attorneys observed, however, the effect
of such a provision is unclear because standards of judicial review of ar-
bitration awards are generally governed by federal or state statutes. 236 More
puzzling were the comments by some respondents that the proposed rule
would be -duplicative of existing statutory provisions: such observations re-
flected ignorance or confusion regarding current standards of review. 237
Whatever the intentions of those responding to the last question, the
construction bar appeared to be generally opposed to further broadening
the scope of appeal. Seventy percent said "no" when asked if the arbitration
rules should provide for "broader standards of appellate review."238 Forty-
seven attorneys, more than a third of those offering written comments, were
particularly concerned with making errors of law reviewable. Another thirty
reasoned that a court should be permitted to determine whether an award
is clearly against the weight of the evidence, or the product of gross or plain
error. Twenty-one respondents even favored subjecting arbitration to stan-
dards of review similar to those governing a jury verdict or a court jhdgment.
On the other hand, the majority of the group appeared to have been mo-
tivated by the concern that increasing the scope of judicial review would
take away a major advantage of arbitration-the finality of the arbitrator's
judgment.
As a number of respondents observed, however, broader judicial review
could only be effectuated if arbitrators were required to provide a written
235. Three hundred forty-seven of 497 respondents, approximately 70%, favored the rule.
236. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
237. Both the Uniform Arbitration Act and the Federal Arbitration Act provide for vacation
of an arbitration award "procured by corruption, fraud or ... undue means." 9 U.S.C. § 10
(1982); UNIF. ARa. ACT § 12, 7 U.L.A. 1, 140 (1985). They also permit vacation in cases of
prejudicial misconduct by an arbitrator. Id. Neither statute, however, contains any reference
to reversal on grounds of the arbitrariness or capriciousness of the arbitrator's decision. Research
has revealed no general arbitration statute in any of the states containing such language.
The notion that many of the attorneys who responded affirmatively were not consciously
supporting a broadening of current standards of review is reinforced by the fact that 19 attorneys
in that group offered written comments to the effect that they supported limited review to
protect the finality of arbitration awards. Moreover, attorneys who favored the rule making
arbitration awards final except in cases of "fraud, arbitrariness and capriciousness of arbitra-
tors" were less supportive of rules requiring arbitrators to provide written findings of fact and
conclusions of law than the overall group. The same attorneys were also less supportive of a
rule providing for a broader scope of appeal of arbitration awards. See infra note 238.
238. Three hundred fifty of 495 respondents, or 70.7%, were against a rule providing for a
broader scope of appeal. Interestingly, an even larger majority (85.2%) of those attorneys who
favored a rule making arbitration awards final except in cases of "fraud, arbitrariness and
capriciousness of arbitrators" disapproved of a broader scope of appeal.
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rationale for their awards. Approximately 55% of those responding indicated
that arbitrators should be required to provide written findings of fact in
cases involving amounts over $250,000; slightly less than half the respondents
supported such a requirement in cases involving lesser amounts. 219 Judging
from the few comments that were received on these issues, attorneys favoring
written findings of fact appeared more concerned with insuring a well-
reasoned opinion and informing the parties of the bases for the decision
than with establishing a basis for appellate review. Some of those opposed
to written findings commented that such a requirement would only prolong
dispute resolution.
Participants registered considerably less enthusiasm for a rule requiring
arbitrators to provide written conclusions of law, particularly in smaller
cases.m Comments indicated that respondents were concerned that such a
requirement might delay final resolution of disputes by opening the door to
unwelcome appeals. In addition, this requirement would impose impossible
burdens on arbitrators who do not have legal training.
G. The Effect of Experience in Arbitration
A wide spectrum of arbitration experience was represented in the survey.24
Not surprisingly, the results indicate that perceptions of arbitration do change
239. Two hundred forty-two of 441 responding attorneys, or 54.9%, favored a rule requiring
arbitrators to provide written findings of fact in cases involving amounts in excess of $250,000.
One hundred ninety-four of 401 responding attorneys, or 48.4%, favored requiring written
findings of fact in cases involving less than $250,000.
240. One hundred seventy-six of 440 responding attorneys, or 40.0%, favored a rule requiring
arbitrators to provide written conclusions of law in support of their award in cases involving
amounts in excess of $250,000. One hundred thirty-two of 399 responding attorneys, or 33.1%,
favored such a rule where the amount in controversy was less than $250,000.
241. The following statistics for the entire survey group indicates the wide range of experience
represented in the survey:
Mean Median
Number of arbitrations
as counsel for a party 8.44 5
Number of AAA arbitrations
as counsel for a party 7.10 4
Number of arbitrations
as arbitrator 2.56 0
Number of AAA arbitrations
as arbitrator 2.10 0
The divergence between the group's mean, or average figures, and the corresponding medians
reflects the fact that while practically all responding attorneys had had some arbitration ex-
perience, a relatively small number of respondents had arbitrated a disproportionate number
of cases (in one or two situations more than a hundred!). Only one in five respondents had
served as counsel in arbitration more than 10 times; only one in 10 had been an arbitrator
more than five times.
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somewhat as experience with the process increases. While tending to be more
critical of certain aspects of arbitration, more experienced attorneys were
generally less supportive of changes to the rules which would make the
process more like litigation.
1. Arbitrators, Remedies and Awards
Generally speaking, the more experienced the attorney as advocate or
arbitrator, the less favorable were that individual's attitudes regarding the
qualifications of arbitrators.2 2 Respect for the AAA's biographical infor-
mation on potential arbitrators also dissipated with increasing experience. 4 3
On the other hand, more experienced attorneys did not necessarily lack
confidence in the fairness of arbitration awards or the predictability of the
process. They were, moreover, less likely to favor a rule requiring arbitrators
to support their awards with findings of fact244 or conclusions of law,2 5 or
242. The trend is reflected in a comparison of three groups with different levels of experience
as an advocate in arbitration. The group ratings are based upon a five-point numerical scale
(with 1.0 representing "excellent" and 5.0 representing "very poor").
Number of Appearances
as Counsel in an
Arbitration
1-4
5-10
11+
Number of
Responses
154
132
94
Group Rating in
Cases Involving
More Than $250,000
2.24
2.31
2.50
A similar trend was reflected with increasing experience as an arbitrator. Similar data was
developed with respect to cases involving less than $250,000.
243. Exemplary of this variation in attitudes is the following comparison:
Number of Appearances
as Counsel in an
Arbitration
1-4
5-10
11 +
Number of
Responses
200
138
93
Percent Finding
AAA Biographical
Data Satisfactory
57.0
47.1
45.2
244. For example, consider the following comparison relating to cases involving amounts in
excess of $250,000:
Number of Appearances
as Counsel in an
Arbitration
1-4
5-10
11+
Number of
Responses
165
134
94
Percent Favoring
Rule Requiring
Findings of Fact
63.3
53.7
34.0
245. For example, consider the following comparison relating to cases involving amounts in
excess of $250,000:
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to favor a rule establishing a "broader scope of appeal." ' 6 Finally, they
tended to be less hostile toward a rule authorizing arbitrators to award
punitive damages.2 7
2. Speed, Efficiency and Economy in Arbitration
A review of pertinent data revealed no direct relationship between arbi-
tration experience and perceptions of the speed and efficiency of the process.
However, support for formal rules establishing specific time schedules for
arbitration decreased with increasing experience. 24s More experienced attor-
Number of Appearances
as Counsel in an
Arbitration
1-4
5-10
11+
Number of
Responses
165
133
93
Percent Favoring
Rule Requiring
Conclusions of Law
46.4
36.8
26.9
246. The following table shows the relationship between number of appearances as counsel
in an arbitration and percent of respondents favoring a "broader scope of appeal" from
arbitration awards:
Number of Apperances
as Counsel in an
Arbitration
1-4
5-10
11+
Number of
Responses
205
138
95
Percent Favoring
Broader Scope
of Appeal
36.1
29.0
15.8
247. The following table, which compares number of appearances in arbitration with per-
centage of respondents favoring a rule specifically authorizing arbitrators to award punitive
damages, reflects less hostility towards such a rule among respondents with more arbitration
experience:
Number of Appearances
as Counsel in an
Arbitration
1-4
5-10
11+
Number of
Responses
206
140
92
Percent Favoring
Rule Allowing
Punitive Damages
25.2
29.3
41.3
248. The following table, which compares number of appearances in arbitration with per-
centage of respondents favoring a rule establishing specific time schedules declines with increasing
experience, reflects less support for such a rule among respondents with greater experience.
Number of Appearances
as Counsel in an
Arbitration
1-4
5-10
11+
Number of
Responses
205
136
96
Percent Favoring
Rule Requiring
Specific Schedules
61.5
52.9
46.9
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neys also indicated that the costs of arbitration compared less favorably to
jury trial or bench trial, although the averages still reflected a general
preference for arbitration in each case. 249 Also, the AAA fee structure played
a more significant role in client counseling for experienced arbitration at-
torneys .250
H. The ABA Survey in Context
The ABA survey is a considerable addition to the relatively small body
of data on commercial arbitration. It may be profitably compared to prior
studies of the process and user information recently assembled by the AAA.
These sources tend to reinforce the dominant themes of the ABA survey
data. On the positive side, these include the relative speed and efficiency of
arbitration, particularly in smaller cases, and arbitrator expertise. Prominent
concerns include attorney-caused delays, inadequate arbitrator selection
methods and consequent variations in arbitrator quality, the absence of
written opinions accompanying arbitral awards, and high administrative costs.
249. The following table compares number of appearances in arbitration with percentages
indicating arbitration is less costly than jury or bench trial. It reveals that as a group, more
experienced attorneys tend to be less certain that arbitration offers cost advantages over liti-
gation.
Number of Appearances
as Counsel in an
Arbitration
1-4
5-10
II+
Number of Appearances
as Counsel in an
Arbitration
1-4
5-10
11 +
Number of
Responses
183
137
88
Number of
Responses
180
135
88
Percent Indicating
Arbitration Is Less
Costly Than Jury Trial
61.2
51.8
51.1
Percent Indicating
Arbitration Is Less
Costly Than Bench Trial
54.4
53.3
46.6
250. The following table compares number of appearances as counsel in an arbitration with
percentages indicating that they were affected by the AAA fee structure in counseling clients
regarding arbitration.
Number of Appearances
as Counsel in an
Arbitration
1-4
5-10
11 +
Number of
Responses
205
140
94
Percent Indicating
Effect of AAA
Fee Structure
35.1
43.6
52.1
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1. Comparison to Prior Studies of Commercial Arbitration
a. University of Chicago Study
In the mid-1950s a University of Chicago survey of 545 commercial cases
administered by the AAA led researchers to conclude that AAA arbitration
was generally a faster method of dispute resolution than the courts.Y This
finding was essentially corroborated by the ABA survey.2 2 The study also
indicated that the use of attorneys fostered delaysY 3 This, too, is not in-
consistent with current survey results describing attorneys as the most im-
portant factor contributing to delays in arbitrationY 4
b. Mentschikoff Study
Attorney-caused delay was also a major theme of a wide-ranging survey
of attorneys, arbitrators and businesspersons engaged in commercial arbi-
tration. These results were published by Soia Mentschikoff in 1961.255 Pro-
fessor Mentschikoff concluded that the presence of attorneys created delays
in the selection of arbitrators and resulted in more frequent postponements
of hearings; attorney participation often "not only failed to facilitate the
decision but was so inadequate as to materially lengthen and complicate the
presentation. ' '2 6 On the other hand, Mentschikoff recognized that trained
counsel might perform an important function in informing arbitrators as to
appropriate legal norms and standards which should be considered in reach-
ing their decision.2Y7
Pertinent legal standards were important to arbitrators in the Mentschikoff
survey. Most arbitrators thought that they ought to reach decisions consistent
with principles of substantive rules of law, although most also said they
would ignore the law if they believed justice so required.258 Mentschikoff
also found that because of the extensive use of experts, arbitration panels
were more likely to be informed as to important commercial "fact-finding
norms" than a judge or jury. 9
The arbitrators studied in the Mentschikoff survey insisted that they did
251. See Smith, supra note 24, at 10, 17-18.
252. See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
253. See Smith, supra note 24, at 17.
254. See supra notes 204-05 and accompanying text.
255. See Mentschikoff, supra note 2, at 859.
256. See id.
257. See id. at 859, 868.
258. According to Professor Mentschikoff's findings, 80% of the arbitrators surveyed believed
that they ought to render awards in accordance with principles of substantive law, although
nearly 90% thought they were free to ignore these rules in the interest of doing justice. In this
respect, concluded Professor Mentschikoff, arbitrator attitudes curiously paralleled those of
appellate courts. Id. at 861.
259. Id. at 868.
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not compromise: in half of the cases the full award was for one side or the
other, and partial awards often represented a division of claims. 260 The
current ABA survey, however, found a good deal of support for the notion
that arbitrators reach unjustifiable compromise decisions. 261
c. Harvard Business School Study
In 1965, the American Mercantile Management Association published the
results of another extensive study of commercial arbitration. Degree can-
didates at the Harvard Business School conducted this survey of business-
persons, arbitrators, and attorneys. 262 The result was a generally positive but
balanced view of the process.
All of the groups surveyed were generally convinced that commercial
arbitration was usually faster and more economical than litigation; 26 3 res-
pondents believed the absence of extensive pretrial practice was a major
factor contributing to this difference. 26 On the other hand, respondents
recognized that arbitration, like litigation, was susceptible to delaying tac-
tics, 265 and that attorneys tended to be associated with more expensive cases. 26
As in the ABA survey, attorneys were sensitive to a variety of factors which
might lengthen arbitration proceedings, especially in complex cases.267 In-
terestingly, they did not always consider speed to be of paramount impor-
tance-particularly in large commercial cases. 268
The study concluded that the single most important factor in commercial
arbitration was the competence of the arbitrator. 269 While all groups saw
arbitrator expertise as an advantage of arbitration,270 there were criticisms
of the lack of consistent arbitrator quality. 27' The authors of the study laid
considerable blame on the arbitrator selection methods employed by the
AAA, which according to the authors "[did] not guarantee qualified [ar-
bitrators]."272
Businesspersons, arbitrators and attorneys all described occasional prob-
260. See Mentschikoff, supra note 2, at 861. See also Smith, supra note 24, at 13-17, 20.
261. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
262. See generally S. LAzA~ius, supra note I (discussing the study and evaluating the potential
use of commercial arbitration in resolving disputes).'
263. Id. at 46-49, 84, 104-05.
264. Id. at 106.
265. Id. at 49.
266. Id. at 22, 50-51, 95.
267. Id. at 104-05.
268. Id. at 105-06. The notion that speed may not always be of paramount importance to
arbitrating parties is consistent with recent pronouncements on behalf of the AAA. See supra
note 159.
269. S. LAzARus, supra note 1, at 22, 66-68.
270. Id. at 47, 51-52, 84, 113.
271. Id. at 46, 76-79, 188.
272. Id. at 76-79. See also id. at 114.
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lems with poor or unfair decisions.273 Moreover, as in the current study,
many attorneys thought the lack of a written opinion was a negative factor. 274
Nevertheless, all groups saw the finality of arbitration awards as a virtue
of the process. 275
d. Kritzer-Anderson Study
More recently, in 1983, Professor Herbert Kritzer and attorney Jill An-
derson conducted another arbitration survey. Kritzer and Anderson compared
case processing time and expense, using as the basis 147 AAA cases and
case dispositions in three federal district courts.27 6 The study reinforced the
conclusion that arbitration was a faster means of resolving disputes than
litigation. 277 This was true even though a higher percentage of court cases
were settled prior to hearing. 278
On the other hand, Kritzer and Anderson's survey data indicated that
arbitration was not necessarily any less expensive than litigation.279 Except
in cases involving less than $5,000, the cost of legal services tended to be
as high or higher in arbitration. 280 Unlike the current AAA study, Kritzer
and Anderson's survey did not account for AAA administrative fees or
arbitrator fees and expenses.
2. Recent Data Compiled by the AAA
a. AAA User Survey
For some time, the American Arbitration Association has sought feedback
from parties at the conclusion of arbitration. Beginning in 1987, the AAA
Department of Case Administration began collecting and analyzing com-
pleted ratings surveys. Through June 1987, the AAA results tended to be
much more positive than the ABA survey data, but in many respects the
AAA and ABA results were consistent.281
AAA clients were asked to rate the performance and demeanor of the
273. Id. at 43-46, 117.
274. Id. at 116-17.
275. Id. at 35, 85, 117.
276. See generally Kritzer & Anderson, supra note 21.
277. Id. at 8-12.
278. Id. at 6.
279. Id. at 17.
280. Id.
281. American Arbitration Association, Arbitration Association User Survey Results, Press
Release (July 7, 1987) [hereinafter User Survey]; G. Friedman, Analysis of Rating Surveys
Returned (June 22, 1987) (unpublished memorandum to AAA regional vice presidents) [here-
inafter Analysis]. One possible explanation for the more critical results of the ABA survey is
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arbitrator, the quality of the list of arbitrators furnished by the AAA, and
the AAA administrative services. In each case, the ratings were considerably
higher than corresponding results of the ABA survey. For example, over
70 01o of those responding to the AAA post-arbitration survey rated the
performance and demeanor of the arbitrator as "excellent";22 nearly nine
out of ten described the quality of the AAA list of arbitrators as "excellent"
or "good."' ' 3
When asked which aspects of arbitration they liked the most, AAA clients
most frequently alluded to the speed of arbitration, the quality of the
decisionmaker, and the relative informality of the process. Cost savings
and fairness were also mentioned as advantages. 28 5
Ironically, but not surprisingly, delays to the process headed the list of
complaints among AAA users.2 16 Like the ABA survey respondents, 2 7 some
AAA clients believed the process could be even speedier.Ul8 Some AAA clients
also expressed concern about the lack of rules of evidence, 2 9 the absence
of reasoned awards, 290 the lack of arbitrator familiarity with the law, 291 and
high AAA fees.292 These concerns are mirrored in the ABA survey.
b. Survey of Closed Cases
Records of four hundred closed AAA construction cases for each of the
years 1982 to 1986 revealed that during that five year period, 55% of the
cases surveyed progressed to award; the remainder were settled or with-
drawn.293 The average time from filing to award was 200 days;294 the average
time to settlement or withdrawal was 179 days. 295 While these figures exceed
that users tended to be more candid when revealing impressions of the process to an independent
body. Even though the AAA funnels user comments through its New York headquarters, parties
may be sensitive to the fact that their criticisms will find their way back to AAA personnel
and arbitrators with whom they may again have dealings.
282. Analysis, supra note 281, at 2.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 3.
287. See supra notes 202-05 and accompanying text.
288. Analysis, supra note 281, at 3.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. AmicAC r ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, CONSTRUCTION ARBITRATION TRIBUNAL REPORTS,
NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY ARBITRATION CoMmrrrEE MEET Ir 4 (Oct. 30, 1986).
294. Id. Survey figures for 1986 indicate that for the 2,096 AAA cases which progressed to
award in that year, the average number of days from filing to award was 238. AMEi cA
ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, SURVEY OF CLOSED CAsEs-1986.
295. Id.
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the average case disposition time attributed to the AAA by earlier surveys,296
they reconfirm that as a general proposition, arbitration is speedier than
litigation.
c. "Compromise" Study
In 1986, the AAA conducted a study-to determine whether or not com-
mercial arbitrators compromised. 297 AAA officials examined 100 randomly
selected commercial cases concluded in 1986. They determined that in over
half those cases, arbitrators awarded more than 60% of the amount claimed
and in another 34% of those cases, arbitrators awarded less than 40% of
the amount claimed. 29 Thirteen percent of the awards were in the range of
40% to 60% of the amount claimed. These results were taken as proof that
arbitrators do not "split the baby," but tend to resolve the case in favor
of one party or the other.
III. RETHINKING ARBITRATION IN THE "POST-MODERN" ERA
The ABA survey demonstrates that, in general, arbitration is a more than
satisfactory alternative to the courts. But the research also indicated that
for many, arbitration failed to provide efficient, economical, and expert
justice. Having taken its place beside the civil justice system as a primary
mechanism for dispute resolution, arbitration must continue to mature and
evolve so it can better meet public needs and expectations. This is the
challenge of the "post-modern" era of arbitration.
There are attorneys, including a number of respondents to the ABA survey,
who would prefer to remake arbitration in the image of civil litigation.
Likewise, there are businesspersons who want to rid arbitration of lawyers
and lawyer-injected formalities. But if arbitration is to retain its separate
identity (which it must), and if attorneys are to remain involved in arbitration
(which, at least under the AAA method, they likely shall), the answer must
lie somewhere between these choices. As AAA decisionmakers increasingly
recognize, user input and other empirical data on arbitration provide valuable
guidelines for the future. 299
296. Compare S. LAzARus, supra note 1, at 48 (finding that average time to award for AAA
commercial arbitration was about three months) with Smith, supra note 251, at 17 (noting that
AAA commercial cases were typically disposed of in 60 to 90 days).
297. American Arbitration Association, Case Administration-Update, Press Release (July
25, 1986).
298. Id.
299. For example, the ABA survey and analysis on construction arbitration has already had
a significant effect on AAA policies and procedures. Telephone interview with George H.
Friedman, AAA Vice President for Case Administration (Nov. 24, 1987).
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A. Improving Arbitrator Performance
The success of arbitration, generally and in the individual case, is directly
dependent upon the personal qualities and abilities of the arbitrator.3°° In a
very real sense, the arbitrator is the process. Efforts to improve arbitrator
performance must have a dual focus. First, the AAA must take greater care
to ensure that its national panels of arbitrators contain only individuals of
proven professional competence and ability. Second, the AAA must make
greater efforts to give the parties a real choice in arbitrator selection.
1. Improving the Pool: Selection and Training
Today there are undoubtedly persons on the AAA's national commercial
and construction panels who do not belong there. To improve the quality
of the arbitrator pool and ensure greater consistency of performance, the
AAA should take greater care in accepting individuals for panel membership.
As a general rule, no person should be accepted unless he is nominated by
one or more current members and until the AAA investigates evidence which
can corroborate that individual's autobiographical information, at least in-
sofar as it relates to claimed professional knowledge and expertise. Un-
doubtedly, the AAA may wish to avoid these formalities in cases involving
persons with a strong professional reputation and considerable arbitration
experience, but nomination should only be made with the concurrence of
the regional vice president and, preferably, the pertinent industry advisory
group.30'
All nominees should be required to attend training sessions within a
specified period after their nomination. Even those with prior arbitration
experience may benefit from a review of pertinent rules and recent court
cases addressing the powers of the arbitrator with regard to such matters as
discovery, admission of evidence, scheduling, final and interim decisions,
and remedies. They may also learn from the experiences of others through
case studies of actual arbitration. 02
300. See supra notes 57-73, 143-56 and accompanying text.
301. George Friedman, AAA Vice President for Case Administration, says that regional
committees of the NCIAC are currently active in reviewing qualifications of construction
arbitrators with regional AAA offices. Letter from George H. Friedman to author (July 31,
1987). A recent resolution of the NCIAC parent committee requires that members of NCIAC
regional advisory councils pass upon all regional nominations to the AAA construction panel.
Telephone interview with George H. Friedman, AAA Vice President for Case Administration
(Nov. 24, 1987).
302. According to Vice President Friedman, the AAA continues to place greater emphasis
on arbitrator training. For example, Friedman notes that the AAA is committed to provide at
least one construction arbitrator training program in each region annually. In 1986, there were
about 60 training programs of this kind; in 1987 the AAA planned 78 training sessions. New
arbitrators are invited to attend an orientation and training session. When an arbitrator com-
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Obviously, some aspects of the arbitrator's role may only be learned
through experience. New arbitrators should first be assigned to three-member
panels with more experienced arbitrators, one of whom would be the panel
chairman. After at least one experience of this kind, the arbitrator would
be better prepared to handle a case singlehandedly.
Professional knowledge and experience do not guarantee that an individual
will be an effective arbitrator. To determine whether an arbitrator has the
personal qualities necessary to properly perform the arbitral role requires
performance data; such information may be derived from tribunal admin-
istrators and arbitrating parties. The current AAA user survey model is a
step in the right direction. 0 3 If the record reveals that a particular arbitrator
habitually delays proceedings, demonstrates a general inability to control the
progress of hearings, or is otherwise incompetent, the AAA should remove
that individual's name from the pool. 3°4 At the very least, user feedback
might offer helpful lessons for future arbitrator training sessions. 30 5
Finally, we must be more realistic about the cost of attracting the kind
of professional people who will be effective arbitrators. While the AAA is
correct in describing the role of the arbitrator as a public service function
and not a livelihood,3°6 many individuals undoubtedly feel constrained from
serving because of the AAA rule that each arbitrator must render a day of
free service to each new case. This burden may be particularly onerous if
arbitrators are also required to attend initial training sessions. Ultimately,
it is submitted, arbitrators should receive a per diem for each day served.
Alternatively, the organized bar and other professional organizations should
recognize and give some form of credit for the valuable public service
performed by attorneys and other professionals as arbitrators.
2. Selecting an Arbitrator for the Case
One of the purported advantages of arbitration is the ability of the parties
to select their own decisionmaker. This choice is restricted in jury trials and
non-existent in bench trials. In arbitration, the parties' choice is limited by
pletes initial training, that fact is noted on the AAA's new computer network and the data
card maintained on the arbitrator in his or her region. According to Friedman, "strong listing
preference" is given to arbitrators who have received formal training. Intermediate and advanced
level training is also offered. Letter from George H. Friedman to author (May 7, .1987). The
AAA Department of Education and Training will be issuing uniform training guidelines for
AAA arbitrators in 1988. Telephone interview with George H. Friedman, AAA Vice President
for Case Administration, (Nov. 24, 1987).
303. See supra note 281 and accompanying text.
304. It is currently the policy of the AAA to remove panelists who are the subject of repeated
complaints by parties and/or administrators. Telephone interview with George H. Friedman;
AAA Vice President for Case Administration (Nov. 24, 1987).
305. See infra note 302.
306. See Ai~mc ARBrrRATiON ASSOCIATION, A GuIDE FOR CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY AR-
BrrAToRs 4-5 (November 1985).
1988]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
the list provided by the tribunal administrator and the information which
the parties have about the potential arbitrators.
In the first place, the parties should be encouraged, if not required, to
supply enough information about the case to the AAA to permit the tribunal
administrator to select appropriate individuals for the list. The very general
form of notice pleading now required by AAA demand forms may offer
the tribunal administrator no clue as to the specific expertise which might
be valuable in choosing an arbitrator. One way of improving the present
system might be to ask both parties to describe the qualifications they desire
in an arbitrator. 0 7 In larger or more complex cases, a pre-hearing conference
with the AAA representative charged with administering the case may offer
the best means of communicating this information. °81 Also, in cases involving
large amounts of money and tripartite panels, arbitrator availability can have
a significant effect on the speed of dispute resolution.3°9 Therefore, the parties
should candidly appraise the anticipated duration of hearings.
As the ABA survey results make clear, the AAA must improve the bio-
graphical data which it supplies.310 At the time of nomination, the AAA
must check the essential accuracy of the information provided to the panel
by the would-be arbitrator. In addition, the AAA should do a better job
of keeping arbitrator records up to date.3 1 ' The biography should also include
more pertinent details, including lists of representative client affiliations or
projects and information on prior experience as an arbitrator. While the
privacy of the parties might require the latter information to be restricted
to descriptions of the type and subject matter of the arbitration, the names
of parties and their counsel might also be listed if both sides consent. Such
information would provide arbitrating parties and their counsel with a much
better picture of an arbitrator's actual experience and, perhaps, sources of
further information regarding that individual's past performance as an ar-
bitrator. 3 2 The AAA has already taken the first steps in this direction with
307. The AAA should also solicit information regarding the relative importance of speed in
dispute resolution. For example, speed may be particularly critical if the claimant alleges material
breach and seeks immediate release from further performance of its contract. The likely duration
of the case should also be assessed prior to arbitrator selection; scheduling concerns should be
one of the major criteria in arbitrator selection. Fabyanske & Halverson, supra note 21, at
289; Horowitz, supra note 13, at 70; supra text accompanying note 167; infra text accompanying
note 309.
308. See COMMERCIAL RuLES, supra note 24, § 10. See also CONSTRUCTION RULES, supra note
24, § 10. Such conferences are also a feature of the AAA's new nonmandatory guidelines for
complex cases. AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, GUIDELINES FOR EXPEDITING LARGER,
COMPLEX CONSTRUCTION ARBITRATIONS (July 1987) [hereinafter COMPLEX CONSTRUCTION AR-
BITRATIONS].
309. Fabyanske & Halverson, supra note 21, at 289; Horowitz, supra note 13, at 70; text
accompanying supra note 167.
310. See supra notes 188-90, 243 and accompanying text.
311. The AAA's National Panels Department currently maintains a policy under which
arbitrator records are updated at least every three years. Telephone interview with George H.
Friedman, AAA Vice President for Case Administration (Nov. 24, 1987).
312. Because many former parties will wish to preserve their privacy, and in light of concerns
regarding the preservation of arbitrator impartiality, it may not be practical to implement a
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the development of a more detailed arbitrator biographical information
summary and a computerized record system.1 3 Although the suggested im-
provements may result in higher administrative costs to the AAA, they may
be more than offset by time and expense saved in investigative time by the
parties. 14
Finally, the AAA must emphasize the role of the AAA tribunal admin-
istrator, the person who is responsible for assembling lists of potential
arbitrators and, frequently, for selecting the arbitrators if the parties fail to
agree on nominees. Given the sensitive nature of the tribunal administrator's
role, the AAA must view the job as something more than clerical. Such
individuals require training in the demands of the job, preferably through
an apprenticeship with an experienced administrator who is familiar with
local attorneys and arbitrators. They also need the ability to communicate
effectively with the arbitrating parties' counsel and to be forceful when the
situation requires it. Moreover, their performance should be assessed and
monitored with the assistance of user surveys. Finally, they should be paid
in a manner commensurate with their true role.
B. Improving the Speed and Efficiency of Arbitration
Generally speaking, speed is a desirable goal in dispute resolution. How-
ever, given the wide range of disputes-small and large, simple and com-
system whereby arbitrating parties are provided with the names of "references" who have
arbitrated before a particular panelist and are familiar with that arbitrator's personality and
capabilities. However, because those with firsthand experience are an invaluable source of-
information about a potential arbitrator, the AAA might explore the possibility of accepting
references on a volunteer basis. See Lawson, Arbitrator Acceptability: Factors Affecting Se-
lection, 36 ARB. J., Dec. 1981, at 22, 25 (indicating that in labor cases, users indicated that
they generally relied on the opinions of their colleagues in selecting arbitrators).
313. The AAA has recently developed a new data sheet for potential commercial and con-
struction arbitrators. Among other things, the form requests information on occupation, past
employment, professional licenses or registrations, academic qualifications, membership in
professional or trade organizations, types of construction expertise (including dollar value of
construction projects and description of recent significant construction projects and activities),
past arbitration experience and related training. See, e.g., AmmmcAN ARBrrRATiON AssOcATION,
CONSTRUcTION PANEL DATA SuEET (Mar. 1987) (on file in the offices of the INDIANA LAW
JouRNAL). A similar form for attorney panelists requires specific information about the indi-
vidual's law practice, including types of clients and cases. See A~maRcAN ARBrrRATION Asso-
cIATION, PANEL DATA SHEET-ATroRNEY (Mar. 1987) (on file in the offices of the INDLANA
LAW JouRN).
AAA Vice President Friedman also notes recent efforts by the AAA to monitor and manage
its national panel of arbitrators. This summer, a computerized filing system was implemented
by the AAA. The system permits the Association to keep track of the number of times a
particular arbitrator is listed by ten of the AAA regional offices. It also enables AAA personnel
to search for particular arbitrator qualifications on a "key word" basis. Letter from George
H. Friedman to author (July 31, 1987).
314. Bayer & Abrahamson, supra note 20, at 31; Coulson, supra note 67, at 676; text
accompanying supra notes 138-39.
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plex-that find their way into arbitration, there is a danger in establishing
universally applied timetables or schedules by formal rule. 31 5 Speed and
efficiency must be furthered by guidelines which are flexible enough to permit
the arbitrator to meet the exigencies of the particular case, but which clearly
empower the arbitrator to establish and enforce schedules.
1. The Preliminary Hearing and the Arbitration Order
Particularly in big cases, arbitration may be prolonged, delayed or dis-
rupted as a result of the failure of arbitrators to set schedules for arbitra-
tion. 31 6 Related problems include the absence of pre-hearing discovery3 7 and
the relative lack of issue definition prior to hearings. 31 8 All of these problems
may be addressed by requiring the parties and arbitrators to have a prelim-
inary hearing or other pre-hearing communication culminating in an arbi-
tration order.
In larger cases, the procedures should require parties to meet or com-
municate with one or more arbitrators to discuss the case. This would permit
the parties to discuss and perhaps to narrow the disputed issues, to stipulate
uncontested facts or issues, and to request pertinent documents. It would
also provide an opportunity to describe the case to the arbitrators and to
offer estimates of presentation time. The arbitrators would then issue an
order (preferably on a standardized form) establishing dates for exchange
of requested documents, if any, and for submission of more definitive
statements of the case, witness lists and exhibit lists. The order would also
establish definite time schedules for presentation of the case. 319
Such a procedure, which was strongly supported by the responses to the
ABA survey, 320 would make it less likely that either of the parties would be
surprised by unanticipated documents or testimony at the hearing. On the
315. This was recognized by the majority of attorneys responding to the ABA survey. See
supra notes 227-28 and accompanying text.
316. See Poppleton, supra note 51, at 7.
317. See supra notes 165-66 and accompanying text.
318. See supra notes 162-63 and accompanying text.
319. New guidelines for larger, complex commercial and construction arbitrations establish
such a procedure. They provide that "unless the parties agree otherwise," the arbitrators may
conduct a preliminary hearing with the parties. Although the guidelines are not explicit, such
a hearing may presumably be called at the arbitrators' own motion, or at the request of one
or both parties. Among other things, the arbitrators may request the parties to describe the
issues in dispute and to specify amounts claimed. Parties are admonished to agree on uncontested
facts and present their stipulations to the panel at the conference.
The panel may establish the scope and scheduling of exchange of documents, including
experts' reports, and require the exchange of lists of witnesses and outlines of their testimony.
The arbitrators are expected to solicit the parties' estimates as to the number of hearing days
required to present their cases, and may establish a hearing schedule on that basis. The arbitrators
may also require briefs and establish schedules for their submission. Finally, the arbitrators
are expected to describe the "ground rules" for hearings. See, e.g., COMPLEX CoNSTUCTIo N
ARBrrRATIONS, supra note 308.
320. See supra notes 210-11 and accompanying text.
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other hand, it would also place greater responsibility on attorneys to co-
operate with their opponent and to have their case fully and efficiently
organized at hearing time; time extensions or continuances would be given
only upon a showing of good cause.
2. Pre-hearing Discovery
A traditional weakness of the AAA Rules is the absence of any specific
provision for arbitrator-ordered discovery prior to hearings. 21 Besides cre-
ating the potential for loss of important documents or witness testimony,
this absence often results in delays at the hearing stage. Thus, while care
must be taken to avoid the extensive pretrial practice of litigation, the AAA
Rules should be amended to make it clear that the arbitrators may order
discovery as they deem it appropriate prior to the actual hearings, at least
insofar as documents are concerned. 32 The provision might also permit the
arbitrators to order depositions in cases of necessity.
3. Sanctions for Delay or Non-cooperation
The ABA survey reflected considerable support for arbitrator-imposed
attorney's fees and other sanctions for violations of the arbitration rules. 323
While the AAA Rules currently permit awards to include the costs of ar-
bitration,3 24 empowering arbitrators to award attorney's fees would add
considerably to the coercive force behind the power to schedule. Parties who
misuse the process by asserting frivolous claims or defenses, fail to cooperate
in exchange of documents, or otherwise frustrate the process would face the
same consequences that similar behavior would bring about in court.
4. Counterclaims, Joinder and Consolidation
In assessing the speed of dispute resolution one must consider the presence
of related claims or disputes, including counterclaims and claims by third
parties. While the former may be addressed by an amendment to the rules
of arbitration,32 the latter demand a more complicated solution.
321. See supra notes 110-11, 165-66 and accompanying text.
322. While the need for arbitrator-ordered discovery prior to evidentiary hearings will in
many cases be met by the new guidelines for complex cases, see supra note 319, the basic
Commercial and Construction Arbitration Rules should be modified to make specific the
authority of the arbitrators to order and schedule discovery, at least to the extent of document
exchange. In cases involving smaller amounts where a full-fledged preliminary hearing might
involve undue expense, a conference call with the arbitrator (or head arbitrator, in the case of
a three-person panel) might accomplish the same goal.
323. See supra notes 231-34 and accompanying text.
324. See supra note 122.
325. It should be noted, however, that concerns regarding the res judicata effect of an
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Resolution of multiparty disputes in arbitration may be a desirable end.
Because no party may be required to arbitrate in the absence of consent,
however, arbitrator-ordered joinder of parties or consolidation of claims
ma , require something more than a simple amendment to the AAA Rules.
In addition to modifications to federal and state arbitration statutes previ-
ously proposed by this author, careful drafting of all pertinent contracts is
essential to establishing the framework for joint arbitration. 326
C. Economic Concerns
It is clear that arbitration is sometimes more expensive than litigation,
particularly in larger cases.3 27 To the extent that such expense is a function
of the length of hearings, reforms directed toward making the process more
efficient may result in cost savings. On the other hand, the ABA survey
revealed considerable displeasure with the administrative fee imposed by the
AAA. 28 While there is no evidence that the AAA administrative fees are
generally excessive, setting the fee as a percentage of the amount claimed
offers no guarantee that the fee will bear any relation to the services actually
rendered in a given case. While some have recommended tying the fee to
the number of days of hearing time, AAA insiders insist that that method
will probably be no better at gauging the actual administrative burden.
A possible improvement might be the development of a system which
required AAA to keep a daily record of services devoted to each case, just
as law firms and other purveyors of services do, and bill against the assessed
fee. At the conclusion of the case, AAA would refund any remaining portion
of the fee or assess an additional amount, if necessary. While such a system
would entail the development of a more sophisticated accounting system
within the AAA, it would directly tie the cost of arbitration to the needs
of the case or the desires of the parties.
D. Concerns Regarding the Award:
Remedies, Rationale and Review
Arbitrators now have broad authority to render justice, and to do so
without significant oversight by courts of law.3 29 The extent of the remedial
power and the breadth of judicial review are two of the most fruitful sources
of disagreement regarding arbitration.
arbitration award with respect to issues which were arbitrated, or properly could and should
have been arbitrated, should strongly discourage parties from failing to assert counterclaims.
See Domke, supra note 1, at 452-55.
326. See generally Stipanowich, supra note 1, at 521-27.
327. See supra notes 207, 279-80 and accompanying text.
328. See supra notes 170-76 and accompanying text.
329. See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
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1. Arbitrator Remedies
a. Punitive Damages
The ABA survey group registered a firm "no" when asked if the Con-
struction Industry Arbitration Rules should specifically permit arbitrators to
assess punitive damages.330 To the extent that the response conveys a desire
to eliminate punitive sanctions from commercial arbitration entirely, it may
stem from the notion that such awards are inconsistent with contract remedies
or from concerns regarding the lack of reviewability of arbitration awards.
It may also reflect more general limitations on punitive damages which are
a prominent feature of recent tort reform.331 On the other hand, a number
of recent cases have acknowledged the authority of arbitrators to award
punitive damages. 32 If public sentiment and public policy ultimately require
that arbitrators be prevented from giving punitive damages, the answer must
lie in statutory reform on both state and federal levels. 333
b. Attorney's Fees
Attorneys gave overwhelming support to an arbitration rule permitting
arbitrators to award attorney's fees. 334 There appears to be considerable
merit in such a rule. Arbitrators have awarded attorney's fees where required
by statute or where the parties specifically permitted such awards. If the
arbitration rules incorporated a more general provision on attorney's fees
the rules would permit policing of bad faith claims and defenses and of
unreasonable delays and disruptions to the arbitration process.
2. The Award Rationale
If arbitrators were required to write opinions in support of their awards,
some might find the task difficult and some might even be discouraged from
serving as panelists. It would require the arbitrators to spend additional time
considering and preparing the award, and this would result in higher costs
to the parties. Most importantly, it would probably increase the likelihood
of appeal and judicial review of the award. On the other hand, such a
330. See supra note 230 and accompanying text.
331. See generally Greengard, Is the Tort System Heading for a Crash?, BARSTER 9 (Winter
1987) (discussing the recent passage of tort reform measures by the ABA House of Delegates
and various states).
332. See supra note 123.
333. In light of recent judicial pronouncements regarding the extreme breadth of the federal
substantive law of arbitrability, punitive damages claims may be arbitrable despite state legislative
enactments prohibiting arbitration of such claims in cases under the FAA. See Stipanowich,
supra note 1, at 991-92 n.217. In such cases, therefore, it may be that only an amendment to
the FAA as well as to state arbitration acts will be effective.
334. See supra notes 231-32 and accompanying text.
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requirement would force arbitrators to consider their decision more carefully
and provide the parties with information regarding the arbitrator's rationale.
It would form a basis for appeal of improper awards and for resolution of
collateral controversies.
Given the strong division of opinion over this issue, 3 5 it may be appropriate
for AAA procedures to accommodate both points of view. If for any reason
parties mutually desire a reasoned opinion, they should be permitted to agree
to have one.336 Moreover, while the assumption under the AAA rules may
continue to be that no written opinion will be issued, AAA procedures might
go further in causing parties to consider the issue and to exercise a conscious
choice in the matter.337 The decision should be made prior to arbitrator
selection, as it might affect the ultimate choice. 3 8
3. Judicial Review of the Award
The topic of judicial review of arbitration awards has stimulated much
academic interest and considerable argument. While a thorough treatment
of this subject is beyond the scope of this writing, it is appropriate to address
the subject of an arbitration rule dealing with review.
First of all, there is a question as to whether the scope of judicial review,
a matter regulated by statute, could be affected by amending the rules of
arbitration. 339 Second, the results of the ABA survey are sufficiently ambig-
uous that it is unclear whether or not the survey group desires to widen
present statutory standards of review. 340 Given the strong public policy in
335. See supra notes 235-37 and accompanying text.
336. While the survey indicated greater support for a rule requiring written findings of fact
than for a requirement regarding written conclusions of law, it is difficult to see how such a
distinction would work in practice. It is submitted that in preparing a written rationale for the
award, commercial arbitrators would be disposed to deal not only with issues of simple fact,
but inferences to be drawn from those operative facts and applicable norms (be they personal,
contractual, or statutory) by which the ultimate decision will be reached. In the strict sense,
then, the opinion would transcend mere factfinding.
Although the AAA does not encourage the writing of opinions, current AAA policy permits
opinions when requested by both parties. Telephone interview with George H. Friedman, AAA
Vice President for Case Administration (Nov. 24, 1987).
337. This goal might be accomplished by a minor revision to the standardized form by which
parties demand arbitration. The claimant could be required to indicate his or her preference
for a written rationale on the demand. In the event the claimant indicated such a preference,
the respondent could be given a certain number of days to object to the procedure. Of course,
the parties should be forewarned that the requirement of a written opinion may increase the
cost of arbitration and the likelihood of appeal and judicial review.
338. In such cases, the parties will probably desire at least one attorney on the panel.
339. See supra notes 235-37 and accompanying text. While it is presumably not within the
power of parties to contract to expand the statutorily-conferred scope of review (as by an
amendment to incorporated arbitration rules), the parties may accomplish the same goal in-
directly. A court may vacate an award on the basis that it exceeds contractually established
limits on the arbitrator's powers. See UNwi. ARB. ACT § 12(a)(3), 7 U.L.A. 1, 140 (1985).
340. See supra notes 235-40 and accompanying text. It is arguable that the "arbitrary and
capricious" standard imposes a "rational basis" test which is already applied by some courts
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favor of the finality of arbitral awards,341 the author reserves judgment on
the issue until there is more persuasive evidence of support for broader rights
of appeal.
CONCLUSION
Arbitration has been called upon to play a major role in domestic and
international dispute resolution-a role far broader than its early proponents
might have anticipated. While few have ever perceived arbitration as a
panacea, it is now widely accepted as an appropriate alternative to civil
litigation of commercial and contractual controversies. The struggle for
acceptance at an end, arbitration must now come to grips with its success.
In her comprehensive history of the early years of the American Arbitration
Association, Frances Kellor emphasized the need for constant adaptation
and improvement of arbitration rules and procedures. 342 In this "post-mod-
ern" era, arbitration demands continued effort by the AAA and other
institutional sponsors to shape the process to more consistently achieve its
defined goals. User information such as the ABA arbitration survey needs
to be an integral part of this effort.
on review of arbitration awards (even in the absence of an express statutory basis). See, e.g.,
Amoco Overseas Oil Co. v. Astir Nay. Co., 490 F. Supp. 32 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
341. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
342. F. KBLLOR, supra note 23, at 66.
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